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THE TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING ACT OF
1984: A SENSIBLE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE
TO THE ILLS OF COMMERCIAL
COUNTERFEITING
I. Introduction
The trademark,' which has played a pivotal role in society for
centuries, has been called "one of the oldest [and most important]
1. A trademark has the following statutory definition: "[tjhe term trademark
includes any word, name, symbol, or device or any combination thereof adopted
and used by a manufacturer or merchant to identify his goods and distinguish
them from those manufactured or sold by others." The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 1127 (1982). A trademark is one component of a triad of exclusive property
rights popularly known as "intellectual property." See generally 1 J. MCCARTHY,
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 6.1-6.9 at 143-73 (2d ed. 1984) [hereinafter
cited as MCCARTHY]. Patents and copyrights are the other two components of this
group. See id. A trademark is distinguishable from other forms of intellectual
property.
One major distinction between trademarks, copyrights and patents is that
Congress has passed laws providing for copyright and patent protection under a
specific grant of power in the Constitution. 1 MCCARTHY, supra, § 6.1, at 144;
see U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. see also; The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82,
93-94 (1879) (congressional regulation of trademarks not rooted in an explicit grant
of constitutional power).
Another fundamental difference lies in the gross-appurtenant distinction. See 1
MCCARTHY, supra, § 6.3, at 151. Trademarks may not be held in gross. In other
words, a trademark may not be stored away for an extended period of time without
the owner running the risk of abandoning his exclusive rights to use the trademark.
See id. However, once a copyright or patent is registered, the owner need not
continuously use either one to maintain his exclusive property rights. Because patents
and copyrights need not be continuously used to retain full protection, they are
deemed property rights which may be held in gross. "It is not necessary that a
patent or the technology it covers be used at all. The patentee can file his patent
away and forget about it if he wishes. It will still remain valid. Of course, a
trademark must be continually used, or else there is danger of abandonment ... "
See id.
Abandonment of a trademark and its ramifications are also regulated by The
Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1982). The essential element in establishing aban-
donment is a showing of a lack of use of the trademark from which an intent to
abandon the mark can be inferred. See generally 1 MCCARTHY, supra, §§ 17.1-
17:10, at 767-90. Upon judicial determination that a trademark has been abandoned,
the trademark falls into the public domain. See Exxon Corp. v. Humble Exploration
Co., Inc., 695 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1983); Manhattan Indus., Inc. v. Sweater Bee By
Banff, Ltd., 627 F.2d 628, 629-30 (2d Cir. 1980) (court described litigants' struggle
for exclusive use of abandoned trademark as "free-for-all"); Dansa Corp. v. Sutton
Cosmetics (P.R.) Inc., 462 F.2d 134, 136 (2d Cir. 1972) (abandoned trademark is
fair game for any merchant or manufacturer who seeks to use it).
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of human institutions. ' ' 2 Trademarks function to identify the maker
of a particular product3 and to embody the goodwill of various
craftsmen in their goods. 4 Thus, trademark law protects the public's
interest in purchasing certain goods, as well as the goodwill developed
through the diligence of the manufacturer.' Trademarks have been
protected by both the common law6 and statutes7.
2. Rogers, The Lanham Act and the Social Function of Trade-Marks, 14 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 173, 173 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Social Function]; see M.
HOPKINS, TRADEMARKS, TRADENAMES AND UNFAIR COMPETITON 1, 2 (4th ed. 1924)
[hereinafter cited as HOPKINS]. See generally Rogers, Some Historical Matter Con-
cerning Trademarks, 9 MICH. L. REV. 29 (1910) (discussion of historical development
of trademarks).
3. The identification of a particular manufacturer's wares by his mark dates
back to the early civilizations of Egypt, Crete, Greece and Rome. See Social
Function, supra note 2, at 173. The trademark was also a prominent feature of
the Medieval Guild System. See id. at 175. The Guild mark ensured that the public
knew what they were purchasing was genuine guild merchandise. Id. at 176.
Moreover, the mark identified the maker, should the goods be defective and
disciplinary. action be needed. See id. at 177.
4. The manufacturer's reputation is embodied in his goods. See Social Function,
supra note 2, at 176. As Justice Holmes noted, "[glood will is the inclination to
go back to where you have been well treated." Id. at 176. Thus, "[tirademarks
make identification possible and enable people to buy with the assurance that they
are getting the merchandise which by faith or experience they believe to be good,
and by the same means to avoid what they dislike or know nothing of." Id. at
176. Thus, in the world of commerce the trademark and the goodwill of the
craftsmen are inseparable. See generally I MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §§ 2.1-2.12,
at 44-92.
5. Trademarks provide a manufacturer with an incentive to create a quality
product. See Social Function, supra note 2, at 175-76. This practice benefits
consumers. Without trademarks, producers would lack incentive to produce sound
merchandise which will reap larger profits than inferior goods. See id. "There
would be competition, to be sure, but it would be competition to see who could
make the worst goods, not the best; and he would win whose product was the
cheapest, poorest and most dishonest." Id. at 175.
Moreover, "[i]f there were no way to tell the good from the bad, why bother
to sell anything but the bad-and the worse, the better." Id. at 176. The trademark
affords the tradesman not only the means by which to establish his reputation in
the community, but also the mechanism to ensure higher profits. As the Supreme
Court has noted: [Trademarks] are the symbols by which men engaged in trade
and manufacturers become known in marts of commerce, by which their reputation
and that of their goods are extended and published; and as they become better
known, the profits of their business are enhanced." The Trade-Mark Cases, 100
U.S. 82, 87 (1879).
6. The precise date of the first unfair competition case at English common
law is debated among scholars. Professor Hopkins has stated that the report of
Popham is substantially correct. HOPKINS, supra note 2, § 5 at 15-16 (citing Southern
(or Southerne) v. How, 2 Popham, 144; Cro. Jac. 471; 2 Rolle, 28; Cox, 633;
Seb. Dig. 1 (1590)).
As the Supreme Court has noted:
The right to adopt and use a symbol or a device to distinguish the goods
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Advances in production technology and sophisticated reproduc-
tion techniques, along with mass media,' worldwide advertis-
or property made or sold by the person whose mark it is, to the exclusion
of use by all other persons, has long been recognized by the common
law and chancery courts of England and of this country ....
The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 92 (1879).
7. Notwithstanding that trademarks are frequently affixed to goods in the
stream of interstate commerce, federal legislation does not completely preempt state
regulation of trademarks See infra note 124. Federal regulation of trademarks is
governed principally by the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051, 1114, 1115, 1117,
1118, 1119, 1126(h) (1982). The first federal regulation of trademarks was enacted
in 1870. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 77-84, 16 Stat. 198, 210-12 (1870). See
infra notes 51-62 and accompanying text, for a discusion of the Act of 1870. The
Act of 1870 was determined to be void for want of constitutional authority in The
Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 96-97. However, as congressional control over
interstate commerce grew, it became clear that trademarks were a proper subject
for federal regulation. See infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
The goal of the Lanham Act is to provide a uniform trademark regulatory
scheme. Diggins, Federal and State Regulation of Trade-Marks, 14 LAW AND
CONTEMP. PROBS. 200, 219 (1946) [hereinafter cited as Federal and State Regulations].
Congress was given an explicit grant of power by the commerce clause to regulate
goods in the stream of interstate commerce. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
The commerce clause authorizes Congress to regulate goods in the stream of interstate
commerce and limits state laws which concern subjects addressed by Congress. See
Gibbons v. Ogden, 24 U.S. 1 (1824). The commerce clause reads in pertinent part:
"The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;" U.S. CONST. art. 1,
§ 8, cl. 3.
"[Sltate laws cannot interfere 'in matters with respect to which uniformity of
regulation is of predominant natural concern.' " Federal and State Regulations,
supra, at 213 (quoting Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 770 (1945)).
Given that Congress sought to provide a uniform federal regulatory scheme, it is
clear that the Lanham Act is the controlling body of law in the trademark field.
See id. at 219.
8. "[Slociety's need for trademarks and for the protections they afford increase
rapidly in relation to the growth of commerce in a particular commodity." Rakoff
and Wolff, Commercial Counterfeiting and the Proposed Trademark Counterfeiting
Act, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 145, 148 (1982) (footnote omitted) [hereinafter cited
as Commercial Counterfeiting]. Consumers have come to recognize brand name
goods throughout the world. See id. at 148-150. This recognition stems from
worldwide advertising and marketing. In a word, a product's market may no longer
be limited to a particular geographic market. Rather, the good may enjoy worldwide
sales brought on by multinational advertising campaigns. See Commercial Coun-
terfeiting, supra, at 150 citing Conlon, Commercial Product Counterfeiting: An
Overview, 1 A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS
273, 274-75 (1981)). Thus, when increased recognition of and production of a good
coalesce, commercial counterfeiting of the good may increase significantly. See id.
The authors cite numerous periods throughout history where a marked increase in
economic activity has been paralleled by an increase in commercial counterfeiting.
See Commercial Counterfeiting, supra, at 145-48. For instance, the introduction
of Roman wine in Gaul was quickly followed by merchants attempting to palm
off counterfeit wine as the legitimate export. Id. at 149. The rapid industrialization
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ing9 and international sales of products, 0 have enhanced consumer
recognition of status items," and consequently, increased the demand
for these goods. Counterfeit goods duplicate the image of the status
item without exacting the quality of the original product. 2 Since
counterfeiters avoid paying taxes on both their merchandise and the
income derived from this activity, 3 counterfeit goods may be sold
at prices substantially below the cost of legitimate merchandise.' 4
Thus, counterfeit goods constitutute a substitute for luxury goods
which are otherwise beyond the purchaser's financial means. 5
of the United States after the Civil War also was met with a correlative increase
in commercial counterfeiting. Id. at 149. Congress enacted the Penal Act of 1876
to deter this activity. Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 274, §§ 1-8, 19 Stat. 141 (1876).
For a discussion of the Penal Act of 1876, see infra notes 63-80 and accompanying
text.
9. See infra notes 11-15 and accompanying text. The legislative history of the
1984 Act traces the development of commercial counterfeiting in the United States.
See generally The Anti-Counterfeiting Act of 1984: Hearings on S. 875 Before the
Subcomm. on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-9 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Senate Hearings
on S. 875]. See supra note 8 for a discussion of the internationalization of commercial
counterfeiting. As consumer recognition of brand name merchandise increases, so
does the demand for these goods and as the demand for bona fide goods increases,
so does the demand for counterfeit goods. See infra notes 11-15 and accompanying
text. Worldwide advertising has acted as a catalyst for increased global recognition
of trademarked merchandise, See id.
10. See infra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
11. "This internationalization [of counterfeiting] is the result of numerous fac-
tors. One factor is the advent of worldwide communications and the increased
activity of multinational corporations, which . . . result in [the] international rec-
ognition of, and desire for, specific name brands." Commercial Counterfeiting,
supra note 8, at 150 (emphasis added); see Senate Hearings on S. 875, supra note
9, at 14-19 (statement of Gerald J. Mossinghoff).
12. See Senate Hearings on S. 875, supra note 9, at 16 (statement of Gerald
J. Mossinghoff).
13. See Commercial Counterfeiting, supra note 8, at 151.
14. See id.
15. Counterfeit goods often constitute a market of luxury goods in that they
duplicate the outward appearance of status items. Counterfeit goods often cost a
fraction of the original's price. See infra note 103. Because the majority of the
consuming public cannot afford to spend the amount of money required to purchase
an original, they turn to the counterfeit goods market to satiate their demand for
status items which are beyond their financial means. See id. For instance, well-
known trademarks are often applied to goods the trademark owner does not even
manufacture. "There also appears to be a growing international consumer interest
in the 'status' value of purchasing designer products. This demand has resulted,
for example, in brand pirates putting fake Cartier labels on book jackets, dresses,
and pencils, products that Cartier itself does not make." Commercial Counterfeiting,
supra note 8, at 150 n.35 (citing Conlon, Commercial Product Counterfeiting: An
Overview, I PRACTICAL APPROACH TO PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND COPYRIGHTS 273,
277, 278 (1981)).
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The problem of commercial counterfeiting is reaching epidemic
proportions. Because commercial counterfeiting is illegal, accurate
records of its growth are unavailable.' 6 However, it is estimated that
this illegal industry drains approximately sixteen billion dollars a
year from the legitimate economy. 17 One court has likened the
problem to a "contagion,' '1 8 noting that the spectrum of goods
which are being counterfeited is "limited only by the outer bounds
of the human imagination." '9
Commercial counterfeiting has spread beyond the confines of lux-
ury goods.20 Reproduction of medical, 2' automotive,' 2 agricultural23
16. Commercial counterfeiters keep few if any business records. Thus, it is
diffcult to chart their economic growth. See Bainton, Seizure Orders: An Innovative
Judicial Response to the Realities of Trademark Counterfeiting, 73 TRADEMARK
REP. 459, 461-62 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Seizure Orders ]; Senate Hearings on
S. 875, supra note 9, at 1-3 (statement of Sen. Charles Mathius).
17. See Senate Hearings on S. 875, supra note 9, at 1.
18. See Fimab-Finanziaria Maglifico Biellese Fratelli Fila S.p.A. v. Kitchen, 548
F. Supp. 248, 250 (S.D. Fla. 1982); accord Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. Karen Bags,
Inc., 592 F. Supp. 734, 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (per curiam) (court labeled commercial
counterfeiting problem of "epic proportions")).
19. Fimab-Finanziaria, 548 F. Supp. at 250; see Commercial Counterfeiting,
supra note 8, at 152.
20. See Commercial Counterfeiting, supra note 8, at 150-54.
21. Counterfeiting has spread to a wide range of industries including medical
supplies. For instance, counterfeiters have reproduced polio vaccines. See Commercial
Counterfeiting, supra note 8, at 152 (citing Frank, Do You Know What You Are
Buying? SATURDAY EVENING POST, July 9, 1955, at 28). Counterfeiters are believed
to have counterfeited component parts of heart machines. The machines are used
to stabilize a patient's heartbeat during open-heart surgery. See Commercial Coun-
terfeiting, supra note 8, at 152 n.58 (citing Heart Pumps, Associated Press, May
10, 1978). Upon learning of the potential danger in utilizing these pumps, the Food
and Drug Administration recalled 357 suspect pumps. See id., at 152 n.61.
More troubling, however, is the counterfeit production of narcotics sold and
consumed in the illicit drug markets. These pills include both tranquilizers and
amphetamines. Commercial Counterfeiting, supra note 8, at 153 n.61 (citing AMA
Says "Look Alike" Drugs are Deadly, United Press Int'l, April 2, 1982). The
counterfeiters often duplicate a narcotic's trademark or trade dress. See id. Un-
suspecting users frequently are injured by these pills. See id. In fact, these drugs
"are believed to have been responsible for at least twelve deaths .... " See id.
22. Counterfeiters also have reproduced various automotive parts, including
engines, gasoline caps and brakes. These goods are often marketed through the
use of counterfeit reproductions of various safety approval stamps. See Senate
Hearings on S. 875, supra note 9, at 1-3 (statement of Sen. Charles Mathius);
Commercial Counterfeiting, supra note 8, at 152. Accidents have attested to the
fact that these goods are of inferior quality. For example, these parts have been
linked to "several automobile accidents" which have resulted in death. See Com-
mercial Counterfeiting, supra note 8, at 152 (citing Conlon, Commercial Product
Counterfeiting: An Overview, 1 A PRACTICAL APPROACH TO PATENTS, TRADEMARKS
AND COPYRIGHTS, 273, 277 (1981)).
23. The use of counterfeit agricultural products has had adverse consequences.
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and aeronautical 24 goods is now commonplace. Since counterfeit
goods are often of inferior quality, 25 their use may present a sub-
stantial risk to the consumer's health. 26
The scope of the commercial counterfeiting problem is great. This
problem transcends the tortious usurpation of the property interest
of a competitor. 27 Commercial counterfeiting generates dangerous
and unnecessary risks of serious injury or death to unsuspecting
consumers28 and jeopardizes our national security.2 9 The societal
interest in abating commercial counterfeiting through effective leg-
islation is an issue of great importance. In an effort to curb the
production of counterfeit goods, Congress passed legislation which
recently amended the Lanham Act and added a new provision to
Title 18 of the United States Code.3" The pillars of this legislation,
"Kenya's annual coffee crop, a mainstay of its economy, was virtually destroyed
in 1979-1980 through the application of counterfeit (and defective) agricultural
chemicals bearing [a] counterfeit label .... " Commercial Counterfeiting, supra
note 8, at 153.
24. A wide range of aeronautical products have been counterfeited. Counterfeit
transistors were uncovered among the parts destined for use in a test of the United
States space shuttle. Commercial Counterfeiting, supra note 8, at 153 (citing Fenby,
Boom in Brand Name Fakes, READER'S DIGEST 135, 135 (English ed. Sept. 1984).
Counterfeiters have also successfully defrauded the militaries of both the United
States and its allies. For instance, "millions of dollars worth of dangerously
substandard [helicopter] parts ... have been sold to NATO allies and American
helicopter fleets." Commercial Counterfeiting, supra note 8, at 153 (citing Bogus
Helicopter Parts Scheme Alleged, Wash. Post, Feb. 12, 1977, at Al, col. 4).
Substandard counterfeit parts have also found their way into components intended
to be used in a variety of defense contracts, including the F-4 fighter jet and the
Chapperal and Lance missile systems. See Commercial Counterfeiting, supra note
8, at 153 (citing Mosier, Issue 39-Count Indictment in Counterfeit Parts Case,
ELECTRONICS NEWS, Dec. 4, 1978, at 1).
25. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
26. See notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
27. This usurpation alone would warrant strict measures to curb counterfeiting.
Notwithstanding the grave health risks generated, commercial counterfeiting drains
an estimated 16 billion dollars each year from the American economy. See Senate
Hearings on S. 875, supra note 9, at 1 (statement of Sen. Charles Mathius). The
amount of jobs lost in the private sector is not readily calculable. It is clear,
however, that the American labor force is cheated out of many jobs by commercial
counterfeiters. See id. Moreover, commercial counterfeiting impinges upon our
nation's and allies' military preparedness. See supra note 24. It is clear, however,
that these costs alone would justify strict legislation to curb this activity.
28. See supra note 21.
29. See supra note 24.
30. The Trademark Counterfeiting Act amends Title 18 of the United States
Code "to strengthen the laws against the counterfeiting of trademarks, and for
other purposes." Senate Hearings on S. 875, supra note 9, at 4. The Trademark
Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1501-03, 98 Stat. 2178-83 (1984)
(to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2330).
[Vol. XIV
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which is popularly known as the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of
1984 (1984 Act),3' are penal sanctions 2 and large monetary fines.33
Congress intended to deter commercial counterfeiting by providing
for these augmented penalties.
31. The Trademark Counterfeiting Act reads in pertinent part:
(a) Whoever intentionally traffics or attempts to traffic in goods or
services and knowingly uses a counterfeit mark on or in connection with
such goods or services shall, if an individual, be fined not more than
$250,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both, and, if a
person other than an individual, be fined not more than $1,000,000. In
the case of an offense by a person under this section that occurs after
that person is convicted of another offense under this section, the person
convicted, if an individual, shall be fined not more than $1,000,000, or
imprisoned not more than fifteen years, or both, and if other than an
individual, shall be fined not more than $5,000,000.
(d) For the purposes of this section-
(1) the term "counterfeit mark" means-
(A) a spurious mark-
(i) that is used in connection with trafficking in goods or services;
(ii) that is identical with, or substantially indistinguishable from,
a mark registered for those goods or services on the principal
register in the United States Patent and Trademark Office and in
use, whether or not the defendant knew such mark was so reg-
istered; and
(iii) the use of which is likely to cause confusion, to cause mistake,
or to deceive; or
(B) a spurious designation that is identical with, or substantially
indistinguishable from, a designation as to which the remedies of
the Lanham Act are made available by reason of section 110 of the
Olympic Charter Act;
but such term does not include any mark or designation used in connection
with goods or services of which the manufacturer or producer was, at
the time of the manufacture or production in question authorized to use
the mark or. designation for the type of goods or services so manufactured
or produced, by the holder of the right to use such mark or designation.
The Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, title II, § 1502(a),
Oct. 12, 1984, 98 Stat. 2178 (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 2320 (Supp. 1985)
(amending 18 U.S.C. § 2319(2)(a) (1979)).
The Trademark Counterfeiting Act also amends the Lanham Act. The Lanham
Act amendment reads in pertinent part:
(d)(l)(A) In case of a civil action arising under section 32(l)(a) of this
Act (15 U.S.C. § 1114) . . . with respect to a violation that consists of
using a counterfeit mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale,
or distribution of goods or services, the court may, upon ex parte
application, grant an order under subsection (a) of this section pursuant
to this subsection providing for the seizure of goods and counterfeit
marks involved in such violation and the means of making such marks,
and records documenting the manufacture, sale, or receipt of things
involved in such violation. (3) The application for an order under this
subsection shall- (A) be based on an affidavit or the verified complaint
establishing facts sufficient to support the findings of fact and conclusions
of law required for such order; and
19861
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However, support for the 1984 Act has not been unanimous.14
Legislation limiting commmercial practices differentiates between the
competing interests of legitimate businessmen and those engaged in
(B) contain the additional information required by paragraph (5)
of this subsection to be set forth in such order.
(4) The court shall not grant such an application unless -
(A) the person obtaining an order under this subsection provides
the security determined adequate by the court for the payment of
such damages as any person may be entitled to recover as a result
of a wrongful seizure or wrongful attempted seizure under this
subsection; and
(B) the court finds that it clearly appears from specific facts that-
(i) an order other than an ex parte seizure order is not adequate
to acheive the purposes [of this Act];
(ii) the applicant has not publicized the requested seizure;
(iii) the applicant is likely to succeed in showing that the person
against whom seizure would be ordered used a counterfeit mark
in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or distribution of
goods or services;
(iv) an immediate and irreparable injury will occur if such seizure
is not ordered;
(v) the matter to be seized will be located at the place identified
in the application;
(vi) the harm to the applicant of denying the application outweighs
the harm to the legitimate interests of the person against whom
seizure would be ordered of granting the application; and
(vii) the person against whom seizure would be ordered, or persons
acting in concert with such person, would destroy, move, hide,
or otherwise make such matter inaccessible to the court, if the
applicant were to proceed on notice to such person ....
A person who suffers damage by reason of a wrongful seizure under
this subsection has a cause of action against the applicant for the order,
. . . and shall be entitled to recover . . . damages for lost profits, cost
of materials, loss of good will, and punitive damages in instances where
the seizure was sought in bad faith, and, unless the court finds extenuating
circumstances, to recover a reasonable attorney's fee. In assessing damages
under subsection (a), the court shall, unless the court finds extenuating
circumstances, enter judgment for three times such profits or damages,
whichever is greater together, with a reasonable attorney's fee, ... the
court may in its discretion award prejudgment interest ....
The Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 1503, 98 Stat.
2179, 2180 (1984) (amending The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d) (Supp. 1985).
32. See supra note 31.
33. Id.
34. The Act of 1984 was opposed by several large retailer groups, including
K-Mart. See Senate Hearings on S. 875, supra note 9, at 34-35 (statement of Robert
Stevenson). The opponents of the Act of 1984 generally are major retailers who
are discounters. See id. Their trade association, the Association of General Mer-
chandise Chains (AGMC), represents the Nation's discount and general merchandise
industry. See id. The Association's President, Edward T. Borda, summarized the
Association's objections to the Act of 1984. In testimony before the Senate, he
stated that
Price-competitive retailers would generally prefer to deal directly with
the manufacturer rather than face the additional costs of obtaining
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prohibited conduct." Legislative line drawing is, therefore, especially
difficult in the field of trademark law.
Trademark owners and their supporters have received the 1984
Act with widespread approval 6 as a sensible congressional response
to a historically pervasive problem.17 Opponents of the 1984 Act,
however, have argued that the scope of definition of counterfeit
mark3" contained in the Act is overly broad. 9 More importantly,
the Act's specific provision for ex parte4° seizure orders has raised
legitimate concerns regarding the potential use of the remedy by
competitors in the marketplace to stifle competition. 41 Finally, op-
ponents of the Act argue that this legislation will generate anti-
competitive effects in the marketplace which may cause violations
of the antitrust laws. 42
merchandise through middlemen or other legitimate but indirect sources.
Some manufacturers refuse to sell to discounters ... to insulate their
products from price competition. In such cases, price-competitive retailers
must seek secondary sources of supply for popular merchandise. AGMC
believes that the extraordinary remedies created by S. 875 would offer
very tempting tools for such manufacturers seeking to cut off, harass,
or intimidate price discounters.
Senate Hearings on S. 875, supra note 9, at 22 (statement of Edward T. Borda).
35. Specifically, it has been argued that the 1984 Act will impinge upon legitimate
business practices such as trade dress competition and the importation and distri-
bution of grey market goods. See Senate Hearings on S. 875, supra note 9, at 35
(statement of Robert Stevenson); These issues are analyzed infra notes 110-218 and
accompanying text.
36. The major supporters of the 1984 Act are the International Counterfeiting
Coalition ("ICC"). See Commmercial Counterfeiting, supra note 8, at 147. The
ICC is composed of large manufacturers of trademarked goods such as Cartier
watches and Jordache Jeans. See id. Luxury items are the prime, but not exclusive
target of commercial counterfeiters. See id. The Coalition was formed with the
intent of combating commercial counterfeiting. Id. at 147. The ICC "seek[s] to
combat commercial counterfeiting through the cooperation with law enforcement
and consumer groups." Id. at 147 n.12.
37. It has been noted that "society's need for trademarks and for the protections
they afford increases rapidly in relation to the growth of commerce in a particular
commodity." Id. at 148. See also supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the technical factors which have facilitated the increase in production
of counterfeit goods.
38. See supra notes 31, 34 and accompanying text.
39. Because normal business practices are, plausibly, within the statutory pa-
rameters of "counterfeit goods," see supra note 31, opponents of the 1984 Act
argued that it was overly broad since legitimate business practices will be impinged
upon. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text. Opponents argued, therefore,
that the Act must be redrawn to suppress the marketing of blatant counterfeit
merchandise. See Senate Hearings on S. 875, supra note 9, at 22 (statement of
Edward T. Borda).
40. See supra note 31.
41. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
42. Criticism of the 1984 Act has centered upon the availability of ex parte
relief. It has been argued that the provision of this remedy will facilitate the
19861
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This Note examines the history of federal trademark regulation,
including the Lanham Act of 1946. 43 The explosive" growth of
commercial counterfeiting and the ineffectiveness of the Lanham Act
to curb this activity will be analyzed in terms of societal costs and
economic benefits."' This Note argues that the 1984 Act is not overly
broad and does not generate impermissible anti-competitive effects. 6
implementation of resale price maintenance programs (RPM). See Senate Hearings
on S. 875, supra note 9, at 22 (statement of Edward T. Borda). During the receiving
of testimony before the Senate, it was stated that the "AGMC notes . . . a similar
linkage between the issue of resale price maintenance, that is manufacturer fixing
of retail prices, and counterfeit trademark legislation." Id. at 22. For a discussion
of these concerns, see infra notes 164-200 and accompanying text.
It must be stressed that the AGMC unequivocally condemned commercial coun-
terfeiting and steadfastly supported legislation which would facilitate the elimination
of this activity. Thus, the AGMC's concerns centered on how to effectuate the
termination of commercial counterfeiting without unnecessarily burdening legitimate
business. Mr. Borda noted:
I want to make clear that AGMC members are unequivocally and un-
alterably opposed to the counterfeiting of trademark goods. The knowing
and willful manufacture or sale of counterfeit trademark goods is an
undesireable practice that should not be condoned. It harms consumers,
trademark owners and AGMC members, many of whom have their own
trademarks and private labels to protect.
Senate Hearings on S. 875, supra note 9, at 20 (statement of Edward T. Borda).
43. The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1982). The history of federal regulation
of trademarks is discussed infra notes 51-109 and accompanying text.
44. Commercial counterfeiting has grown tremendously during the past ten years.
See Seizure Orders, supra note 16, at 459. As one commentator has noted, "[diuring
the last several years while most sectors of this country's economy were going
through an economic downturn, the counterfeiting of goods bearing federally reg-
istered trademarks blossomed." See id. This growth cannot be accurately measured.
See id. However, it appears that the "thriving" business of commercial counterfeiting
costs American business as much as $16 billion annually. See Senate Hearings on
S. 875, supra note 9, at 1-5 (statement of Sen. Charles Mathius).
45. When trade practices are curtailed by legislative fiat, there are both costs
and benefits. The "costs" of the Act of 1984 are nominal. It appears that the
1984 Act was not intended to limit the scope of legitimate business practices. While
it may appear that the specific inclusion of ex parte relief to curb commercial
counterfeiting is a large cost, the proper application of the ex parte provisions
should not impinge upon the practices of legitimate business. For a discussion of
the ways the 1984 Act will affect legitimate business practices, see infra notes 110-
218 and accompanying text.
The benefits of the 1984 Act are as follows: The danger of counterfeit goods
to both consumer safety and national security is great, see supra notes 21-26 and
accompanying text. Because of the gravity of these dangers, legislation which will
limit trade practices causing these injuries is beneficial. For a discussion of the
dangers of commercial counterfeiting, see supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
46. See supra notes 34-42 and accompanying text; see also infra part VII.
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Moreover, this Note argues that the specific inclusion of the ex parte"I
seizure order which the Act provides for as a remedy does not impinge
upon due process liberty interests and is essential to deter commer-
cial counterfeiting."8 Finally, the future prospects of trademark regula-
tion will be analyzed in light of the Act."9 This Note recommends
that the two-tiered analysis discussed in Part VII be undertaken in
employing the 1984 Act.5
II. The History of Federal Trademark Regulation
A. Federal Regulation of Trademarks: 1870-1946
Federal regulation of trademarks has been both long and turbulent.
Although the initial demand for Federal regulation of trademarks
occurred almost two hundred years ago," Congress did not enact
comprehensive trademark legislation until the Trademark Act of
1870.52 The goal of the Trademark Act of 1870 (Trademark Act)
was to establish a comprehensive federal regulatory scheme." This
47. Ex parte is defined as:
On one side only; by or for one party; done for, in behalf of, or on
the application of, one party only.
A judicial proceeding, order, injunction, etc., is said to be ex parte
when it is taken or granted at the instance and for the benefit of one
party only, and without notice to, or contestation by, any person adversely
interested ....
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 517 (5th ed. 1979). The Supreme Court has noted that
the fact that ex parte relief is granted at the motion of one party raises serious
concerns. See infra notes 219-25. Specifically, it may be the party's unwavering
belief in his claim rather than the propriety of his legal posture that may cause
him to seek ex parte relief. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 83 (1972). Because
the relief prayed for is given for the benefit of one party without giving the adversely
affected party notice, a court should closely scrutinize the pleadings before granting
this extraordinary relief. See id. at 83-84.
48. See infra notes 271-336 and accompanying text.
49. See infra notes 182-218 and accompanying text.
50. See infra Part VII.
51. Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson first addressed the issue of federal
trademark legislation when a group of sail manufacturers sought to install trademark
legislation granting their cloth with a trademark. No legislation resulted, but the
issue was ventilated. See Commercial Counterfeiting, supra note 9, at 155.
52. Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, §§ 77-84, 16 Stat. 198, 210-212 (1870). See
generally Diamond, The Historical Development of Trademarks, 65 TRADE-MARK
REP. 265 (1975); Pattishall, Two Hundred Years of American Trademark Law, 68
TRAE-MARK REP. 121 (1978) [hereinafter cited as American Trademark Law].
53. See HOPKINS supra note 2, at 501-13.
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legislation provided for both injunctive relief54 and monetary damages55
against violators .56
During the post-Civil War reconstruction period, American society
was infested with "chicanery of every kind, giving to this era its
image of greed and corruption that has persisted to the present. '5 7
Despite this corrupt environment, the Trademark Act did not include
penal sanctions.5" This omission has often been cited as the reason
for the Trademark Act's failure to arrest the problem of counterfeit
good production in the post-Civil War period.59
In McLean v. Flemming,6° the Supreme Court reviewed an action
brought under the Trademark Act. The constitutionality of the
Trademark Act was not in issue. 6' Rather, the Court addressed the
specific trademark infringement issues between the parties. In af-
firming the circuit court's finding of a violation of the Trademark
54. Section 79 provides in pertinent part
[Any person or corporation who shall reproduce, copy, counterfeit, or
imitate any such recorded trademark, and affix the same to goods of
substantially the same description ... shall be liable to an action on
the case for damages for such unlawful use of such trademark at the
suit of the owner thereof in any court of competent jurisdiction in the
United States, and the party aggrieved shall also have his remedy according
to the course of equity to enjoin the wrongful use of his trademark and
to recover compensation therefor in any court having jurisdiction over
the person guilty of such wrongful use.
Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, § 79, 16 Stat. 198, 210 (1870).
55. See id.
56. While violators were subject to both monetary damages and equitable rem-
edies, see supra notes 54-55, they were not subject to penal sanctions. See infra
notes 57, 58 and accompanying text.
57. See Commercial Counterfeiting, supra note 8, at 157.
58. See id.; notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
59. See Commercial Counterfeiting, supra note 8, at 157.
60. McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245 (1877). In McLean, the Court stated that
"[p]rotection for lawful trade-marks may be obtained by individuals, firms or
corporations entitled to the same, if they comply with the requirements prescribed
by the act of Congress .... 9" Id. at 248. The Court did not address whether the
statute itself was constitutional, it merely presumed that it was constitutional. See
id. The Court further stated: "the provision is, that a trade-mark duly registered
as required, shall remain in force thirty years from the date of such registration,
subject to an exception not necessary to be noticed." 16 Stat. 210; Rev. Stat., §§
4937, 4941. McLean, 96 U.S. at 248.
61. McLean, 96 U.S. 245 (1877). A careful reading of McLean supports the
proposition that the Court merely assumed that the Trademark Act was consti-
tutional. The Court so noted in The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879), discussed
infra notes 70-80 and accompanying text.
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Act, the Court recognized for the first time the validity of Congres-
sional power to regulate trademarks. 62
In an effort to curb the ever increasing tide of commercial
counterfeiting 63 which continued to flourish in the late 1870's, 64
Congress sought to add penal sanctions to the civil remedies 65 pro-
vided for by the Trademark Act. The Penal Act of August 14, 1876,66
(Penal Act) established criminal penalties17 for violations of the
trademark laws of the United States. 8
The issue of the constitutionality of federal regulation of trade-
marks was addressed by the Supreme Court in 1881 in the seminal
Trade-Mark Cases.70 Therein, the Court reviewed three convictions
in actions brought under the Penal Act. 7' The Attorney General of
the United States argued that the Court's recognition of the Trade-
mark Act's validity in McLean72 a fortiori established the consti-
tutionality of the Penal Act. 73 The Court rejected this argument and
struck down the federal regulatory schemes, noting that federal
regulation of trademarks was in "exercise of a power not confided
to Congress." '74
The Court based its decision on two different constitutional pre-
62. See supra notes 60-61 and accompanying text.
63. See Commercial Counterfeiting, supra note 8, at 157.
64. See id.
65. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
66. Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 274, 19 Stat. 141-142 (1876).
67. The Act of 1876 reads in pertinent part:
That every person who shall with intent to defraud, deal in or sell, or
keep or offer for sale, or cause or procure the sale of, any goods of
substantially the same descriptive properties as those referred to in the
registration of any trade-mark, pursuant to the statutes of the United
States, to which, or to the package in which the same are put up, is
fraudulently affixed said trademark, or any colorable imitation thereof,
calculated to deceive the public, knowing the same to be counterfeit or
not the genuine goods referred to in said registration, shall, on conviction
thereof, be punished by fine not exceeding one thousand dollars, or
imprisonment not more than two years, or both such fine and impris-
onment.
Act of Aug. 14, 1876, ch. 274, § 1, 19 Stat. 141 (1876).
68. See id.
69. Id.
70. See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
71. See id. at 91.
72. See McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. at 245; notes 60-61 and accompanying
text.
73. See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 95-96.
74. Id. at 97.
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cepts. First, that Congress was not given the explicit grant of power
to regulate trademarks75 that it had been given with respect to both
copyrights76 and patents. 7 Second, that Congress can regulate items
which move in interstate commerce. 78 In deciding that federal trade-
mark legislation failed to limit its regulatory reach to the stream of
interstate commerce,7 9 the Court stated that federal regulation of
trademarks was void for want of constitutional authority.80 This
decision completely invalidated the existing trademark regulations.
The next attempt of Congress to regulate trademarks came with
the Trade-Mark Act of 1881 (Act of 1881).11 This Act was expressly
drawn to fill the gap left open by the Court in the Trade-Mark
75. It is interesting to note that commentators writing during this period noted
that Congress had no power under the copyright and patent clause to regulate
trademarks. See American Trademark Law, supra note 52, at 129. It had been
stated that "[the right of property in trademarks does not partake in any degree
of the nature and character of a patent or copyright, to which it has sometimes
been referred-nor is it safe to reason from any supposed analogies existing between
them." Id. (quoting F. UPTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRADE MARKS 14
(1860)). Congress, however, failed to recognize the distinction between patents,
copyrights and trademarks inherent in the Constitution. See id. at 129.
76. The authority of Congress to enact legislation regulating patents and copyrights
is explicitly provided for by the Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
Congress has the power to "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." Id.
77. See id. There is no mention of trademarks in the constitutional grant of
power for the regulation of patents and copyrights. See id. Moreover, the Court
noted that the distinction between trademarks, copyrights and patents is deeper
than the explicit grant of constitutional power to Congress to regulate the latter
two. See id. The fundamental distinction between the two groups is that:
The trade-mark may be, and generally is, the adoption of something
already in existence as the distinctive symbol of the party using it. At
common law the exclusive right to it grows out of its use, and not its
mere adoption. By the act of Congress this exclusive right attaches upon
registration. But in neither case does it depend upon novelty, invention,
discovery, or any work of the brain .... While such legislation may
be a judicious aid to the common law on the subject of trade-marks,
... we are unable to see any such power in the constitutional provision
concerning authors and inventors, and their writings and discoveries.
The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 94; see Commercial Counterfeiting, supra note
8, at 158-60
78. "[Congress shall have the power] to regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,
and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. 1,
§ 8, cl. 3.
79. See The Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 96. The Court noted that Congress
had sought, however, to regulate that which was "beyond the control of Congress."
Id.
80. See id. at 98-99; Commercial Counterfeiting, supra note 8, at 158-60.
81. See Act of March 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502 (1881).
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Cases: it was enacted to regulate trademarks used in commerce "with
foreign nations, or with the Indian tribes. ' 8 2 The Act of 1881 did
not, however, provide for criminal sanctions.83
The next major development was the passage of the Trade-Mark
Act of 1905 (Act of 1905),84 which was designed to comport with
the increased control Congress was exercising over interstate com-
merce during the beginning of the twentieth century. 85 The Act of
1905 was amended sixteen times and resembled a "crazy-quilt of
irrational provisions." 6
The deficiencies of the Act of 1905 led to a new movement in
the 1930's to create a cohesive body of federal trademark regulation.
A congressional committee, headed by Representative Fritz Lanham,
began the task of consolidating pre-existing federal trademark law.
With the support of the New York Bar Association and other
influential groups whose assistance was needed to devise a compre-
hensive federal regulatory scheme,8 7 the Lanham Act was passed in
1946.18
82. Id. § 1. The Act provided "that owners of trade-marks used in commerce
with foreign nations, or with the Indian tribes [may register trademarks]." It is
clear from the wording of the Act that Congress intended to stay within the explicit
parameters of its commerce clause power. See supra note 78. Thus, Congress
avoided the constitutional deficiencies which caused the Supreme Court to strike
down its earlier efforts to regulate trademarks. See supra notes 51-80 and accom-
panying text.
83. See Act of March 3, 1881, ch. 138, § 9, 21 Stat. 502 (1881). Section 9
did not provide for criminal penalties. Id.; see also Commercial Counterfeiting,
supra note 8, at 160-61 (historical survey of federal trademark legislation); HOPKINS,
supra note 2, at 546-47 (same). It has been suggested that the Court's decision in
The Trade-Mark Cases created "more than a century's federal antipathy for criminal
sanctions against trade-mark infringement may be derived psychologically from the
fact that [this case] arose out of criminal indictments .... " American Trademark
Law, supra note 52, at 130; see Derenberg, The Problem of Trademark Dilution
and the Antidilution Statutes, 44 CALIF. L. REV. 439, 442-48 (1956) (hereinafter
cited as Trademark Dilution].
84. Act of Feb. 20, 1905, ch. 592, 33 Stat. 724 (1905).
85. See Swift v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905), J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA
& J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 150-57 (2d ed. 1983).
86. See Commercial Counterfeiting, supra note 8, at 160 (historical survey of
development of federal trademark legislation); see also American Trademark Law,
supra note 52, at 136 (same).
87. D. ROBERT, THE NEW TRADE-MARK MANUAL 235 (1947) [hereinafter cited
as ROBERT]; see American Trademark Law, supra note 52, at 136; Commercial
Counterfeiting, supra note 8, at 160.
88. Trade-Mark Act of 1946, July 5, 1946, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1982); see ROBERT,
supra note 87, at 236; American Trademark Law, supra note 52, at 135; Commercial
Counterfeiting, supra note 8, at 160; Social Function, supra note 2, at 177-84.
President Truman signed the Act into law on July 5, 1946. See ROBERT, supra
note 87, at 236.
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The functions of the Lanham Act are threefold. First, it con-
solidates all federal trademark law and repeals the prior legislation
specifically referred to in the Lanham Act. 9 Second, it re-enacts
certain prior legislation and creates new procedural and substantive
rights. 9° Third, the Lanham Act implements American commitments
with foreign nations and modernizes the trademark law of the United
States by recognizing changes in business and commercial practices
since the Act of 1905 became the law. 9' The Lanham Act has been,
and remains, the backbone of American trademark law. 92
B. 1946 through 1984
After passage of the Lanham Act, the incidence of commercial
counterfeiting grew tremendously. 9 This was especially true during
the 1970's and 1980's. 94 However, the pattern of commercial coun-
terfeiting changed in two respects. First, commercial counterfeiting
expanded beyond the production of luxury goods. 95 Second, the
operations of commercial counterfeiting began to resemble those of
organized crime, as counterfeiting rings developed into networks with
89. See H. Res. 1654, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 92 CONG. REc. 7524 (1946); ROBERT,
supra note 87, at 259; Social Function, supra note 2, at 181.
90. See H. Res. 1654, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 92 CONG. REc. 7524 (1946); ROBERT,
supra note 87, at 259; Social Function, supra note 2, at 181.
91. See H. Res. 1654, 79th Cong., 2d Sess., 92 CONG. REC. 7524 (1946); ROBERT,
supra note 87, at 259; Social Function, supra note 2, at 181.
92. While the Lanham Act is the controlling body of federal law regulating
trademarks, other federal statutes are implicated in trademark regulation. See infra
note 212 and accompanying text. Specifically, the Customs Duties Act may control
the importation of merchandise which bears a trademark. See id. Interpretation of
the Customs Duties Act often addresses the issue of whether grey market goods
may be imported to the United States and distributed by merchants other than the
trademark owner's exclusive distributor. See id.
93. The exact monetary figures of this growth are unavailable for numerous
reasons. This result is due primarily to commercial counterfeiters' failure to keep
business records or their propensity to destroy them when a judicial proceeding
begins. See Seizure Orders, supra note 16, at 459. Senator Mathius has "estimated"
that commercial counterfeiting costs American business approximately 16 billion
dollars annually. See Senate Hearings on S. 875, supra note 9, at 1. Moreover, it
should be noted that, while most of the American economy was experiencing
reduced revenues during the recessionary and inflationary 1970's and 1980's, com-
mercial counterfeiting flourished. See Seizure Orders, supra note 16, at 459. As
one practitioner has noted, commercial counterfeiting "blossomed." See id.
94. See Seizure Orders, supra note 16, at 459.
95. Commercial counterfeiting is no longer limited to the production of luxury
goods, it has spread to the reproduction of medical, automotive, agricultural, and
aerospace industries as well. See supra notes 18-25 and accompanying text; see also
Senate Hearings on S. 875, supra note 9, at 1 (statement of Sen. Charles Mathius).
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organized characteristics. 96 Counterfeiting began to utilize drug traf-
ficking methods-where few, if any, records were kept. 97
Several factors, including deficiencies in the Lanham Act 9 and
advances in technology, caused commercial counterfeiting to evolve
into an organized, multinational network. 99 First, the Lanham Act
failed to provide a criminal penalty as a deterrent to commercial
counterfeiting.' °0 Since prosecution of a commercial counterfeiting
case would frequently result only in nominal damages,' 0 ' counter-
feiters acted with impunity. Second, mass advertising created a world-
wide demand for status items,'0 2 which increased the demand for
96. J. Joseph Bainton, a leading practitioner in the field of trademark protection,
has noted:
[Clounterfeiters changed their methods of operation to make them more
covert and more transitory. In general terms the counterfeiters came
(a) to deal exclusively in cash, (b) to maintain no records of either
purchases or sales of counterfeit goods, (c) to secrete their inventory of
counterfeit goods and (d) to conceal their identity from individuals to
whom they sold their counterfeits, . . . [t]he pattern of covert conduct
now universally adopted by trademark counterfeiters mirrors that em-
ployed by organized crime in connection with its manufacture and dis-
tribution of illicit drugs.
Seizure Orders, supra note 16, at 461-62 (footnote omitted).
97. Id.
98. Congress, probably stemming from the Supreme Court's ruling in the Trade-
Mark Cases, felt "inhibited" in adding criminal sanctions to trademark legislation.
Perhaps for this reason the Lanham Act of 1946 did not provide for criminal
sanctions. See Trademark Dilution, supra note 83, at 442-48; American Trademark
Law, supra note 52, at 135; Commercial Counterfeitng, supra note 8, at 159-60.
This omission of criminal sanctions has been cited as one of the root causes of
the explosion of commercial counterfeiting. See supra note 83 and accompanying
text.
99. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
100. Senator Mathius noted that "something must be done to help business fight
the debilitating economic effects of counterfeiting and to protect the consumer
from shoddily and life-threatening products." Senate Hearings on S. 875, supra
note 9, at 1. The Senator noted that the criminal penalties of the Trademark
Counterfeiting Act of 1984 are designed to "provide the counterveiling force"
required to arrest this problem. Id. Thus, it is clear that the omission of criminal
penalties in federal trademark regulation was a root cause of the recent explosion
of commercial counterfeiting. See id.
101. The plaintiff has the burden of proof in establishing a reasonable damage
figure in counterfeit litigation. See Seizure Orders, supra note 16, at 462. In the
vast majority of commercial counterfeiting cases, the defendant disposes of the
evidence of the crime before the trial. See id. These actions render it virtually
impossible for the plaintiff to sustain his burden of proof. See id. at 462 n.8.;
see also Vuitton et Fils, S.A. v. Crown Handbags, 492 F. Supp. 1071 (S.D.N.Y.),
aff'd 622 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1979). The problems of pleading and proving damages
in a commercial counterfeiting case are discussed infra notes 248-50 and accom-
panying text.
102. Congressional recognition of changing business habits, technological advances
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counterfeit goods.103 Third, technological advances facilitated the
production of an increased supply of counterfeit goods to meet this
demand. ,04
Congress again recognized that advances in technology and chang-
ing business practices necessitated the reform of the trademark laws. 10
Citing advances in reproduction technology and the tangible con-
sequences of omission of a penal sanction' °6 to the trademark laws,
Congress passed the 1984 Act.'0 7 The 1984 Act implements two basic
changes. First, it seeks to deter commercial counterfeiting by pro-
viding for penal sanctions'08 and second, it contains remedial devices
including the ex parte seizure order to insure meaningful judgments.'°9
and other commercial realities were the catalyst to the reform of federal trademark
laws which resulted in passage of the Lanham Act. See ROBERT, supra note 87,
at 295 (remarks of Rep. Lanham citing these reasons as the impetus for new federal
legislation in the field of trademark law); 92 CONG. REC. 7524 (1946).
103. One merchant particularly plagued by commercial counterfeiting is the Rolex
Watch Company. Certain models of the Rolex line retail at prices in excess of
$8000. See Kiesel, Battling the Boom in Bogus Counterfeit Goods, 71 A.B.A.J.
60, 61 (March 1985) [hereinafter cited as Battling the Boom]. A counterfeit can
be purchased for approximately $100 to $300. See id. Counterfeiters capitalize upon
the "snob appeal" of these status items. See id. These products' "images are
created by the expenditure of millions of dollars on advertising and promot[ion]."
Id. It has been noted that "[t]rademark counterfeiting would not be prevalent
without a market for bogus goods, . . . People are hungry for bargains and are
tempted to buy them .... ." Id. at 63 (quoting James Bikoff, President of the
Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition).
104. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text. Trademark owners, however,
have come to utilize highly technical devices to stymie counterfeiters' efforts. One
such anti-counterfeiting device utilized by trademark owners is "Polaproof." Po-
laproof labels change colors when held in various positions. See Battling the Boom,
supra note 103, at 63. Another technique involves the numerical encoding of
merchandise with computer generated light beams. These codes serve to "fingerprint"
the merchandise. See id. at 63. Both techniques facilitate the detection of counterfeit
merchandise.
105. The Committee on the judiciary noted that "[a]s counterfeiters have built
larger and more professional enterprises, they have become increasingly callous
towards the judicial process." S. REP. No. 526, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted
in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3627, 3627-28.
106. The legislative history of the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984 is replete
with accounts of accidents and injuries stemming from commercial counterfeiting.
Id. at 3630-31. Some of these consequences have been summarized supra notes 21-
26 and accompanying text.
107. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
108. The 1984 Act provides penal sanctions for violations of the trademark laws.
The individual may be imprisoned for up to fifteen years for violations of the
1984 Act pursuant to the enhancement provision. See 18 U.S.C. § 2320(a) (Supp,
1985) for a reproduction of the 1984 Act's penal sanctions. See supra note 31.
109. See 18 U.S.C. § 116(d)(l)(a); supra note 31.
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III. The Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984
and its Effect on Commercial Practices
Opponents of the 1984 Act have questioned its effect on com-
mercial practices1 ° such as trade dress infringement,'" parallel
imports' 2 and antitrust violations.'' 3 Citing the strictly imposed pen-
alties under the 1984 Act for trademark violations, as well as the
availability of ex parte injunctive relief, opponents argue that the
Act impinges upon the competitive practices of business." 4 A review
of the 1984 Act and its intended application suggests that the Act
will not chill legitimate commercial activity, nor will it create an
anti-competitive environment.
A. Trade Dress Duplication and The Trademark Counterfeiting
Act of 1984
Trade dress infringement, in the context of counterfeiting, is de-
fined as the marketing of a good or service which would confuse
the potential consumer into believing that the counterfeit product
is actually one produced by the legitimate manufacturer." 5 Trade
110. Opponents of the 1984 Act have argued that the Act's definition of "coun-
terfeit good[s]" is overbroad and therefore impedes the exercise of lawful business
practices. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
111. The 1984 Act's potential impact on trade dress duplication is discussed infra
notes 115-63 and accompanying text.
112. The grey market, which involves the importation and distribution of "parallel
imports," is discussed infra notes 201-18 and accompanying text.
113. Opponents of the 1984 Act have argued that it may be used to install and
maintain a resale price maintenance program. See supra note 42 and accompanying
text. The antitrust laws and policies of the United States, as well as the 1984 Act's
potential effect on these policies is considered infra notes 164-200 and accompanying
text.
114. See supra notes 39, 42 and accompanying text.
115. Trade dress has been judicially defined: " '[tirade dress' involves the total
image of a product and may include features such as size, shape, color or color
combinations, texture, graphics, or even particular sales techniques." John H.
Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (lth Cir. 1983) (citing
Original Appalachian Artworks, Inc. v. Toy Loft, Inc., 684 F.2d 821, 831 (lth
Cir. 1982); SK & F Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Inc., 481 F. Supp.
1184, 1187 (D.N.J. 1979), aff'd, 625 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1980); see also, MCCARTHY
supra note I, § 9:1, at 282-302 (discussion of trade dress and federal trademark
law). Thus, trade dress is the commercial garment in which a manufacturer wraps
his product. See I MCCARTHY, supra note 1, at § 9:1, at 282-302 (discussion of
trade dress). Trade dress therefore encompasses the totality of the product's ap-
pearance.
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dress infringement is a violation of both federal" 6 and state"7 law.
The federal and state regulatory schemes seek to protect legitimate
116. The Lanham Act provides remedies for a manufacturer who has suffered
injuries stemming from a competitor's unauthorized use of his trade dress in any
manner that would confuse the consuming public into believing that the good was
manufactured by the trademark owner. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides:
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connection with
any goods or services, or any container or containers for goods, a false
designation of origin, or any false description or representation, including
words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same,
• . . shall be liable to a civil action . . . by any person who believes that
he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description
or representation.
The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982). To enjoin trade dress reproduction,
plaintiff must establish that the defendant's trade dress is likely to confuse the
consuming public. See, e.g., Freixenet, S.A. v. Admiral Wine & Liquor Co., 731
F.2d 148 (3d Cir. 1984) (injunctive relief denied manufacturer of black foiled
champagne styled bottle, competitor's trade dress sufficiently dissimiliar to generate
confusion as to source); Williams v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 691 F.2d 168 (3d Cir.
1982) (injunctive relief granted to manufacturer who incorporated plaintiff's parts
numbering system in its trade dress); SK & F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical
Laboratories, Inc., 625 F.2d 1055 (3d Cir. 1980) (injunctive relief granted against
manufacturer producing indistinguishable replica of plaintiff's trade dress); Ciba-
Geigy Corp. v. Bolar Pharmaceutical Co., 547 F. Supp. 1095 (D.N.J. 1982) (plain-
tiff's trade dress non-functional-preliminary injunction granted), aff'd, 719 F.2d
56 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1080 (1985); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon,
564 F. Supp. 741, 754 (N.D. I11. 1983).
117. ALA. CODE § 8-12-16 (1984); ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.170 (1985); ARIZ. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 44-1454 (Supp. 1984); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 70-549 (1979); CAL. Bus.
& PROF. CODE § 14,321 (Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-70-111(1)(a), (b) (1973);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-11(i) (West 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §
2532(a)(1), (2), (3) (1974); D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-1402 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
495.131 (West 1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-450(a) (1982); HAWAII REV. STAT. §
481A-3 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 48-511 (1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 140, § 19 (Smith-
Hurd 1964); IND. CODE ANN. § 24-2-1-13 (Burns 1982); IOWA CODE ANN. § 548.10
(West Supp. 1985); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 81-121 (1984); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
365.615 (Bobbs-Merrill 1972); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:222 (West Supp. 1985);
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1529 (1980); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. ll0B, § 11
(Michie/Law Co-op. 1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 429.42 (West 1978); MINN.
SESS. LAW SERV. § 333.28 (West 1981); Miss. CODE ANN. § 75-25-21 (1972); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 417.056 (1979); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-13-333 (1983); NEB. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 87-121 (1981); NEv. REV. STAT. § 52-600.420 (1983); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 350-A:11 (1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:3-13.11 (West Supp. 1985);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-3-9 (1978); N.Y. GEN. Bus. § 368b (McKinney 1984); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 80-11 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 47-22-11 (1978); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1329.65 (Page 1979); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 78, § 31 (West 1976); OR.
REV. STAT. § 647.095 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 23 (Purdon 1971); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 6-2-11 (Supp. 1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-15-220 (Law. Co-op.
1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 37-6-25 (Supp. 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. §
47-25-511 (1984); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.26 (Vernon 1968); UTAH CODE
ANN. § 70-3-14 (1980); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2530(1), (3), (5) (1984); VA. CODE
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manufacturers from trade dress infringement" 8 by preventing the
marketing of goods or services which bear symbols or marks that
cause, or are likely to cause, confusion as to the source of their
origin. " 9
If a manufacturer's trade dress is protected, trade dress infringe-
ment may be enjoined. 20 The determination of whether the trade
dress qualifies for protection is made by employing a two-pronged
approach.'2' The first prong addresses the issues of "distinctiveness,"' 22
§ 59.1.88 (1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.77.140 (1978); W. VA. CODE § 47-
2-3 (1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 132.02 (West 1974); Wyo. STAT. § 40-1-111 (1977).
118. Most trade dress infringement actions involve disputes over the packaging
or labeling of goods. See, e.g., Falcon Rice Mill, Inc. v. Community Rice Mill,
Inc., 725 F.2d 336, 338, 344 (5th Cir. 1984); Brooks Shoe Mfg., Co. v. Suave
Shoe Corp., 716 F.2d 854, 856 (lth Cir. 1983); John D. Harland Co. v. Clarke
Checks, Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 980 (lth Cir. 1983); American Rice, Inc. v. Ark.
Rice Growers Coop. Ass'n., 701 F.2d 408, 411 (5th Cir. 1983); Chevron Chem.
Co. v. Voluntary Purchasing Groups, Inc., 659 F.2d 695, 697-98 (5th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1126 (1982); Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Freuhauf Corp.,
536 F.2d 1210, 1214 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976).
119. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, §§ 30.1-30.23, at 465-94. Injunctive relief is
specifically provided for by the Lanham Act. 15 U.S.C. § 1116 (1982). Injunctive
relief is an equitable remedy. The plaintiff, therefore, must establish that the remedy
at law is inadequate. Injunctive relief, however, does not preclude an award of
money damages. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 30.2, at 465. While "injunctive
relief is the "standard remedy" in unfair competition cases ... this does not
necessarily mean that money damages cannot be recovered in addition to an
injunction, [a]n injunction, looks to the future while money damages look to
compensation for past injuries." See id.
120. See supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
121. Sicilia Di R. Biebow & Co. v. Cox, 732 F.2d 417, 425 (5th Cir. 1984).
122. In Sicilia, the court noted that the term "distinctiveness" is itself a term
of art that "indicate[s] that a mark or dress services as a symbol of origin, and
thus is protectable. Fanciful and arbitrary marks are considered inherently dis-
tinctive." Id. at 425 n.3. One court has stated:
'A fanciful mark' is a word which is coined for the express purpose of
functioning as a trademark .... [T]hose which are descriptive may
obtain registration [and protection] only if they have acquired secondary
meaning, while suggestive terms are entitled to registration [and protection]
without such proof.
Id. (citation omitted); see West & Co. v. Arica Inst. Inc., 557 F.2d 338, 342 (2d
Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (footnote omitted); see also Sun Banks of Fla., Inc. v.
Sun Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n., 651 F.2d 311, 315 (5th Cir. 1981); Abercrombie &
Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9, 11 (2d Cir. 1976).
In Sun Banks the court noted that "the essential question is the 'likelihood of
confusion' concerning the identity or association between [the parties] . . .due to
their common useage of the name and mark 'SUN.' " Sun Banks, 651 F.2d at
314. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1114(l) (1982).
"A vital factor in the determination whether there is a likelihood of confusion
between the two services marks at bar is the strength or weakness of ... [plaintiff's]
mark. Service marks fall into four categories. A strong mark is usually fictitious,
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"secondary meaning"'123 and "functionality" 124 in determining whether
arbitrary or fanciful and is generally inherently distinctive." Sun Banks, 651 F.2d
at 315 (footnote omitted).
"A descriptive mark tells something about the product; is protected only when
secondary meaning is shown." Id. at 315 (citing Vision Center v. Opticks, Inc.,
596 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1016 (1980). See Miss Universe,
Inc. v. Patricelli, 408 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1969). But see Hesmer Foods, Inc. y.
Campbell Soup Co., 346 F.2d 356 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 839 (1965)
(barbecue beans used as descriptive, not as trademark). A descriptive mark is readily
distinguishable from a suggestive mark. A suggestive mark, "subtly connotes some-
thing about the service or product." Sun Banks, 651 F.2d at 315. A suggestive
mark is protected without a showing of secondary meaning. Id. at 315; see also
Soweco, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 617 F.2d 1178, 1184 (5th Cir. 1980); cert. denied,
450 U.S. 981 (1981).
The fourth and final category of mark is generic terms. Generic terms communicate
'information about the nature or class of an article or service.' " Sun Banks,
651 F.2d at 315 (citing American Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co.,
494 F.2d 3, 11 (5th Cir. 1974)). A generic mark can never become a service or
trademark. Sun Banks, 615 F.2d at 315 (footnote omitted).
123. Secondary meaning has been termed "the law's recognition of the psycho-
logical effect of trade symbols upon the buyer's mind." 1 MCCARTHY, supra note
1, § 15:2, at 658. Justice Frankfurter's definition of secondary meaning in the
seminal case of Mishawaka Rubber & Woolen Mfg. Co. v. S.S. Kresge Co., 316
U.S. 203 (1942) contains the following language:
The protection of trade-marks is the law's recognition of the psychological
function of symbols. If it is true that we live by symbols, it is no less
true that we purchase goods by them . . . .The owner of a mark exploits
this human propensity by making every effort to impregnate the at-
mosphere of the market with the drawing power of a congenial symbol
... [i]f another poaches upon the commercial magnetism of the symbol
he has created, the owner can obtain legal redress.
Id. at 205 (emphasis added). See also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 15:1, at 658-
59 (discussion of secondary meaning). Thus, commercial magneticism implies that
the primary element of the secondary meaning is the " 'mental association in buyers'
minds between the alleged mark and a single source of the product.' " See Sicilia,
732 F.2d at 425 n.4 (citation omitted). Secondary meaning has also been defined
by the Restatement of Torts. "The phrase 'secondary meaning,' as thus used, does
not mean a subordinate or rare significance. It means rather a subsequent significance
added to the previous meaning of the designation and becoming in the market its
usual and primary significance." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 716 comment b (1938).
The Restatement no longer addresses the issue of trademark law. The drafters
noted that the controlling body of law is the Lanham Act. See RESTATEMENT OF
TORTS 2d § 716 Tentative Draft, No. 8 (1963).
124. "Functionality" is also an amorphous term subject to various legal inter-
pretations. Simply stated, functionality allows the copying of designs or features
that "contribute to efficiency or economy in manufacture or handling, or to
durability." 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 8:6, at 295. Society has a keen interest
in competition between manufacturers in the marketplace, "because of the consuming
public's 'interest in free competition and in Federal recognition of a competitor's
right to copy a product in the public domain may not be impinged upon by state
unfair competition laws which prohibit the reproduction of shapes and patterns
which federal law does not protect.' " See Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co.,
[Vol. XIV
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the trade dress qualifies for protection.'25 The second prong of the
analysis determines whether the protected mark or dress has been
infringed. 126
The distinctiveness portion of the first prong refers to the ability
of a mark or dress to distinguish the origin of manufacture of a
product. 27 In the hierarchy of trademark law, a mark which is
"arbitrary"'' 21 or "fanciful,"' 2 9 is unquestionably distinctive. 30 The
sole purpose of designing and attaching the mark is to distinguish
the good to which it is affixed from those to which it is not. 3 '
The acquisition of secondary meaning by a symbol or dress occurs
when an ordinarily plain dress or feature becomes associated in the
minds of the public with the particular manufacturer.3 2 When this
occurs, the mark or dress is elevated by power of association to
the distinctive category and thus acquires protected status.'33
376 U.S. 225, 230-31 (1964); see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 8:7, at 294-
96. However, the Sears-Compco doctrine does not totally preempt state regulation
of trade dress infringement. See Sears, 376 U.S. at 232; see also Ideal Toy Corp.
v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp., 685 F.2d 78, 81 (3d Cir. 1982) (state law must
accommodate federal law under Sears and Compco but is not totally preempted
in preventing marketing of products which may cause confusion as to source);
Chicago Lock Co. v. Fanberg, 676 F.2d 400, 405 (9th Cir. 1982) (court notes state
law cannot override federal regulatory schemes).
125. Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 425.
126. See id.
127. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. "Distinctiveness is the term used
to indicate that a mark or dress serves as a symbol of origin, and thus is protectable."
See Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 425 n.3.
128. An arbitrary mark "consists of a word or symbol which is in common
usage in the language, but which is arbitrarily applied to the goods or services in
question in such a way that it is not descriptive or suggestive." I MCCARTHY,
supra note 1, § 11:2, at 435. They are often referred to as "strong" marks and
are given a broad scope of judicial protection against infringement. See id. Des-
ignation as an arbitrary or fanciful mark is important. Arbitrary and fanciful marks
need not establish secondary meaning to obtain federal registration or protection
in the marketplace. See id. For a discussion of the distinction between the various
categories of marks and their respective strengths, see supra note 122 and accom-
panying text.
129. See Sicilia, 732 F.2d, at 425 n.3. "Fanciful marks are equated with arbitrary
marks in that both are developed for the express purpose of functioning as a
trademark." I MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 11:2, at 435.
130. See id.
131. The trademark is a means by which the competitor may distinguish his
product from other products. The federal regulatory scheme allows the competitor
to enjoy exclusive rights in the use of the trademark. See supra notes 1-10 and
accompanying text.
132. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
133. Id.
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"Functionality" encompasses the actual physical and operational
features of a product's dress. 3 4 Functionality addresses the elements
of a container which contribute to its efficiency or economy in
manufacturing, handling, or durability.'35 Purely functional features
are neither protected from copying by a competitor, nor does their
reproduction give rise to an infringement action. However, in re-
producing the functional feature which is not protected by federal
law, the competitor may not reproduce the feature's trade dress if
the dress' secondary meaning can be established. 3 6
The second prong of the analysis examines whether the protected
134. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
136. See Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 425. When the trade dress in issue is purely functional,
it is not entitled to protection from copying. Id. To enjoin a competitor's use,
"[a] plaintiff must satisfy the likelihood of confusion test by the use of some
feature of his own, not something already in common use." 1 MCCARTHY, supra
note 1, § 8:6, at 296.
Spangler Candy Co. v. Crystal Pure Candy Co., 353 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1965)
is illustrative of the distinction between the permissible copying of functional features
and the impermissible copying of trade dress. In Spangler, plaintiffs manufactured
and marketed a brand of lollipops. See id. at 642. The lollipop was marketed
under the name "Dum-Dums" and consisted of a banded ball on a stick. Defendant
marketed a lollipop which was a precise duplicate of the plaintiff's banded ball
lollipop. See id. The defendant also utilized a trade dress scheme similiar to plaintiff's
wrappers. See id. at 643.
The court of appeals employed a bifurcated analysis in determining first, whether
the copying of the lollipop itself was permissible and second, whether the defendant's
marketing efforts through a similiarly styled wrapper were permissible.
As to the defendant's reproduction of the lollipop itself, the court of appeals,
relying on Sears and Compco, stated:
In Sears and Compco the Court held that the federal patent laws had
established a policy of competition which gives the right to appropriate
any unpatented commercial products in the public domain and that federal
policy prevents the states from protecting property rights in such com-
petitive products. It would appear that little or no relief is now available
in the case of product simulation.
Id. at 646. Thus, injunctive relief was unavailable for enjoining the defendant's
reproduction of plaintiff's lollipop. However, Sears and Compco did not preclude
injunctive relief as to marketing of his lollipops in similar wrappers if plaintiff
could establish secondary meaning of his wrappers. See id. at 647. Plaintiff, however,
was unable to establish the requisite secondary meaning of his wrappers. In affirming
the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's trade dress infringement action, the court
of appeals noted that there was insufficient evidence to establish consumer rec-
ognition of plaintiff's product to establish secondary meaning. Rather, consumer
demand "[was] for penny lollipops wrapped individually in wax paper and sold
in a polyethylene bag." 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 8:7 at 244 (discussing
Spangler).
Thus, while the reproduction of the functional features may be permissible,
reproduction of the product's trade dress which results in consumer confusion is
impermissible if the party can establish his product's secondary meaning.
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mark or dress has been infringed. The infringement issue is resolved
by determining whether a likelihood of confusion exists.' 37 The ques-
tion of remedy'38 arises only after it is determined that the defend-
137. Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 425.
138. As the court of appeals noted in Sicilia, "the question of remedy arises
only after a court finds infringement of a protected property interest by another
product's dress or mark that will likely confuse the consuming public as to source."
Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 425. Professor McCarthy notes that there are at least three
ways for determining whether the likelihood of confusion exists: (1) survey evidence;
(2) evidence of actual confusion; and/or (3) argument based on a clear inference
arising from comparison of the conflicting marks and the context of their use. See
2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23:1, at 45.
Survey evidence is probative of the existence of confusion in the marketplace.
The goal of survey evidence is to establish the existence of the "subjective mental
associations and conclusions" of a group of would-be consumers as to their
conception of source. See id. § 32.46, at 765. See also Symposium, The Structure
and Uses of Survey Evidence in Trademark Cases, 67 TRADE-MARK REP. 97 (1977).
Evidence of actual confusion is clearly probative of the existence of a "likelihood
of confusion" of source in the market place. As noted, "[t]he test of infringement
is the likelihood of confusion, not the proof of actual confusion." 2 MCCARTHY,
supra note 1, § 23:2, at 50. The standard of proof is likelihood of confusion in
the marketplace as to source. Plaintiff must establish that consumers would likely
be confused when confronted with both products. This is necessarily the proper
burden, otherwise plaintiff would have to sustain actual injury before he would
be entitled to injunctive relief. See Standard Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 56 F.2d
973, 979 (10th Cir. 1932); see also 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23:2, at 50-51.
However, evidence of actual confusion is strong proof that a likelihood of confusion
exists. Id. at 51; see Tisch Hotels, Inc. v. Americana Inn, Inc., 350 F.2d 609, 612
(7th Cir. 1965). Clearly such evidence is powerful evidence. As one court noted,
"[t]here can be no more positive or substantial proof of the likelihood of confusion
than proof of actual confusion." World Carpets, Inc. v. Dick Littrell's New World
Carpets, 438 F.2d 482, 489 (1971).
Additionally, a court may examine arguments based on a clear inference arising
from a comparison of the conflicting marks and the context of their use. In
determining whether the actor's designation is confusingly similar to the other's
trademark, several factors may be examined. The Restatement of Torts employs
a test that has been likened to a trilogy of "sound, sight and meaning." See 2
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 23:4, at 57. The Restatement of Torts' test employs
the following factors:
(a) the degree of similarity between the designation and the trade-mark
or trade name in
(i) appearance;
(ii) pronunciation of the words used;
(iii) verbal translation of the pictures or designs involved;
(iv) suggestion;
(b) the intent of the actor in adopting the designation;
(c) the relation in use and manner of marketing between the goods or
services marketed by the actor and those marketed by the other;
(d) the degree of care likely to be exercised by
purchasers.
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 729 (1938); see Drexel Enters., Inc. v. Richardson, 312
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ant has infringed upon a protected property interest by utilizing
another product's dress or mark in a manner that is likely to cause
confusion as to its source. 139
The determination of whether a competitor's trade dress is pro-
tected involves the weighing of competing interests.' 0 Society benefits
from keen competition in the marketplace.' A narrow definition
of functionality may lead to a competitor's unwarranted exploitation
of a product through the monopolization of a specific trade dress; 42
this position runs counter to the competitive nature of our econ-
omy. 43 However, society also must protect the creativity of the
F.2d 525, 528 (10th Cir. 1962); Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop,
Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 543 (2d Cir. 1956); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Johnson, 219
F.2d 590, 592 (3d Cir. 1955); Standard Brands, Inc. v. Eastern Shore Canning
Co., 172 F.2d 144, 146 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 925 (1949); Franklin
Mint, Inc. v. Franklin Mint, Ltd., 331 F. Supp. 827, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Villager,
Inc. v. Dial Shoe Co., 256 F. Supp. 694, 700 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
139. "Likelihood of confusion" is the basic test of both common law trademark
infringement and federal statutory trademark liability. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra
note 1, § 23:1, at 42-43. At common law, the test is similar to that of its federal
counterpart. Compare McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 251 (1878) (Court notes
that traders may not use marks such that "ordinary purchasers ... are likely to
be misled [as to source]") with Johnny Walker & Sons, Ltd. v. Bethea, 305 F.
Supp. 1302, 1307 (D.S.C. 1969) (federal test requires a degree of similarity which
results in likelihood of confusion such that some of public may believe two goods
emanate from same source). The federal statutory standard for likelihood of con-
fusion is also centered on the confusion as to source in the mind of the consumer.
See Communications Satellite Corp. v. Comcet, Inc., 429 F.2d 1245, 1252 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970); Friend v. H.A. Friend & Co., 416 F.2d
526, 531-32 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 914 (1970); Blazon, Inc. v.
Blazon Mobile Homes Corp., 416 F.2d 598, 599-600 (7th Cir. 1969); Sweetarts v.
Sunline, Inc., 380 F.2d 923, 928 (8th Cir. 1967); Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid, Inc.,
319 F.2d 830, 833-34 (7th Cir. 1963); Coca-Cola Co. v. Snow Crest Beverages,
Inc., 162 F.2d 280, 283 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 332 U.S. 809 (1947); see also Norm
Thompson Outfitters, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 300 F. Supp. 274, 277 (D.
Or. 1969), aff'd, 448 F.2d 1293 (9th Cir. 1971); Field Enter. Educ. Corp. v. Cove
Indus., Inc., 297 F. Supp. 989, 994 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); Stix Prods., Inc. v. United
Merchants & Mfrs., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 479, 492-93 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Villager, Inc.
v. Dial Shoe Co., 256 F. Supp. 694, 702 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
140. See generally Note, The Broad Sweep of Aesthetic Functionality: A Threat
to Trademark Protection of Aesthetic Product Features, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 345
(1982) [hereinafter cited as Aesthetic Product Features]; Note, The Problem of
Functional Features: Trade Dress Infringement Under Section 43(a) of the Lanham
Act, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 77 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Functional Features].
141. See generally Aesthetic Product Features, supra note 140, at 354-59.
142. See id. at 372-73; Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 429-30; see also Inwood Laboratories,
Inc. v. Ives Laboratories, Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 859 (1982) (White, J., concurring);
In re Morton-Norwich Prods. Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1339-40 (C.C.P.A. 1982); 1
MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 7:26 at 236-237.
143. See Sicilia 732 F.2d at 427-30; Ideal Toy Corp. v. Plawner Toy Mfg. Corp.,
685 F.2d 78, 81 n.4 (3d Cir. 1982); Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653
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manufacturer by shielding his creative efforts, or risk creating a
disincentive to originality.'" Thus, an overly expansive definition of
functionality has been criticized in that the copying of a wider range
of product designs and features necessary is allowed. 45
While the balancing of these conflicting interests has always been
important, the situation has become acute since the passage of the
1984 Act. 46 Given the threat of criminal sanctions 47 and heavy
civi' 48 penalties for violations of the 1984 Act, opponents of the
Act have argued that a more precise definition of trade dress in-
fringement and a more uniform scope of functionality is required. 49
F.2d 822, 827 (3d Cir. 1981); Vuitton et Fils, S.A. v. J. Young Enters., Inc., 644
F.2d 769, 773-75 (9th Cir. 1981). See generally Functional Features, supra note
140, at 89.
144. See Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 428. Therein the court noted "[it would be un-
fortunate were we to discourage use of a spark of originality which could transform
an ordinary product into one of grace." Id. (quoting Keene Corp. v. Paraflex
Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d 822, 825 (3d Cir. 1981)).
145. See Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 429-30; John H. Harland Co. v. Clarke Checks,
Inc., 711 F.2d 966, 983 n.27 (lth Cir. 1983); see also Functional Features, supra
note 140, at 88; Note, Unfair Competition and the Doctrine of Functionality, 64
COLUM. L. REV. 544, 562 (1964).
146. A typical scenario might involve the following facts. An aggressive man-
ufacturer consciously duplicates what he feels is the functional trade dress of a
competitor. The competitor is aware of the duplication and institutes an action in
federal district court to enjoin the infringement under the Lanham Act. The
manufacturer, cognizant of the augmented penalties under the 1984 Act, will avoid
any borderline practices which run the risk of characterization as commercial
counterfeiting. This chilling effect, it is argued, will disserve the public interest in
free and open competition in the marketplace. See Senate Hearings on S. 875,
supra note 9, at 22 (statement of Edward T. Borda).
147. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
149. There is a divergence of opinion in the circuits as to what precisely constitutes
functional features. As one court noted, "[clourts have differed in applying func-
tionality to deny protection to designs or configurations that serve some functional
purpose." Sicilia, 732 F.2d at 425. Whether the trade dress is within the ambit
of protection may turn on whether the features are functional (and unprotected)
or whether the sole and unique purpose is to designate the origin of the goods.
One view is that unless the dress serves uniquely to identify the source, it will not
be entitled to protection under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. See Sicilia, 732
F.2d at 425; Vibrant Sales, Inc. v. New Boutique, Inc., 652 F.2d 299, 304 (2d
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 909 (1982); SK & F, Co. v. Premo Pharmaceutical
Laboratories, Inc., 625 F.2d 1055, 1063 (3d Cir. 1980) (court interpreting common
law of New Jersey and Lanham Act to require proof of non-functionality to show
element of product serves no purpose other than identification); Pagliero v. Wallace
China Co., 198 F.2d 339, 343 (9th Cir. 1952) (same).
This expansive view of functionality has been criticized. See generally Functional
Features, supra note 140; Aesthetic Product Features, supra note 140. Other courts
have narrowed the definition of functionality. Thus, the trade dress need not serve
the unique and exclusive purpose of identifying the source of the goods to fall
19861
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Opponents of the 1984 Act also have questioned the breadth of
the Act's definition of "counterfeit mark,""'  which includes the
term "spurious mark.""'' Opponents fear that this previously un-
interpreted term will receive an overly broad construction, which
will generate unwarranted litigation over trade dress and result in
an anti-competitive environment. 5 2
These fears may be unfounded. First, the legislative history of
the 1984 Act clearly states that the Act's definition of counterfeit
good does not extend to imitations of trade dress'53 unless the
imitation is accomplished by the counterfeit duplication of a reg-
istered trademark. 15 4
within the ambit of section 43(a) protection. See Truck Equip. Serv. Co. v. Fruehauf
Corp., 536 F.2d 1210, 1218 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1976) (court
notes features primarily arbitrary and incidentally functional entitled to protection).
It is important to note that a court interpreting a narrower definition of functionality
is primarily concerned with the underpinning of the doctrine-the effect on com-
petition. See id. at 1218. A competitor forced to find his own dress is not hindered
in competition. See id.; see also Keene Corp. v. Paraflex Indus., Inc., 653 F.2d
822, 827 (3d Cir. 1981); General Radio Co. v. Superior Elec. Co., 321 F.2d 857,
864 (3d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
Notwithstanding this divergence of opinion in the circuits concerning the proper
scope of functionality, it appears that the 1984 Act will not subject a competitor
to liability regardless of which view is taken. It is clear from the legislative history
of the 1984 Act that Congress intended that trade dress imitations be excluded
from the definiton of counterfeit mark. See infra note 153.
150. The 1984 Act's definition of counterfeit good and spurious mark are re-
produced supra note 31.
151. See id.
152. The term "spurious mark" is a new addition to the vocabulary of federal
trademark regulation. However, the 1984 Act equates the meaning of counterfeit
mark with that of spurious mark. See supra note 31. Therefore, "counterfeit" and
"spurious" are synonomous terms. It seems logical that a court would not encounter
difficulty interpreting "spurious mark." The plain language of the statute provides
an ample limitation on the construction of the term "spurious mark."
153. It is clear from the 1984 Act's legislative history that trade dress imitations
should be excluded from the definition of counterfeit good. The Committee on
the Judiciary stated "the bill does not extend to imitations of features of trade
dress or packaging-such as color, shape and the like-unless those features have
been registered as trademarks [on] the principal register in the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office and are in use." S. REP. No. 98-526, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1,
11, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3627, 3637.
154. A plain reading and literal interpretation of the 1984 Act supports this
proposition. The 1984 Act excludes from its definition of counterfeit goods those
products which have their genesis in authorized production. The 1984 Act reads
"but such term does not include ... goods or services . . . [for] which the
manufacturer or producer . . . authorized [the] use [of] the mark or designation
for the type of goods or services so manufactured or produced. ... The Trademark
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While "[t]he precise definition of when a mark is 'identical to
or substantially indistinguishable from' a registered mark" will need
to be developed by the courts on a case by case basis,' it is clear
that this definition does not encompass "what would formerly have
been arguable, although not clear-cut, cases of trademark infringe-
ment."'15 6 The threshold standard of liablity, therefore, has not been
significantly lowered'57 so as to cause severe reverberations in the
legitimate channels of trade.' Thus, the definitions of spurious
marks and counterfeit goods are not overly broad.1'9
Moreover, Congress has expressly provided a deterrent for any
potential abuse of the 1984 Act's extraordinary remedies by overly
zealous competitors. A competitor who wrongfully subjects another
to a seizure order may be liable for damages. 6° He may also be
liable for attorney fees'16 where the seizure was clearly erroneous.
The history of the 1984 Act reflects the Congressional intent to
protect the practices of legitimate business in creating this legisla-
tion. 62 Congress, recognized that consumers benefit from keen com-
petition in the marketplace and therefore excluded trade dress imitation
from the scope of activities which are embraced by the 1984 Act's
definition of counterfeit good. 63 Therefore, it is probable that trade
dress imitation will continue in much the same manner as it did
Counterfeiting Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. at § 2320(d)(1)(B). The 1984 Act requires
that the good be of the "type" authorized by the manufacturer. See id. This is
to avoid situations where the defendant applies a well known trademark to goods
which he is not authorized to produce. The 1984 Act's exclusion of authorized
goods would not be a defense in this situation.
155. S. REP. No. 98-526, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 10 (1984), reprinted in 1984
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3627, 3636.
156. Id. at 11, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3637.
157. See supra notes 155, 156 and accompanying text.
158. It is clear from a comparison of the Lanham Act before and after its
amendment that the scope of liability for trade dress infringement has not been
expanded significantly.
159. See supra notes 154-57 and accompanying text.
160. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(1l)) (Supp. 1985) (attorney's fees and damages
authorized). It is also clear that in egregious cases involving bad faith, a court
may award plaintiff punitive damages if he is subject to a wrongful ex parte order.
See id.
161. See id.
162. The Committee stated that "[tlo ensure that ex parte seizure orders are
used only when necessary and that they are not abused for anti-competitive purposes,
the bill contains numerous procedural protections .... " Senate Reports on S. 875,
supra note 9, at 15 (emphasis added).
163. See supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text.
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prior to the 1984 Act's enactment. Thus, the 1984 Act will not
generate an anti-competitive environment with regard to trade dress
imitation.
B. The 1984 Act: Potential Antitrust Violations
Congressional recognition of an imperfect economic environment
is reflected in the antitrust laws of the United States. 64 The underlying
concern of Congress in enacting these statutes was to eliminate the
undesireable effects of unbridled competition, including the concen-
tration and monopolization of society's resources of production . 65
Certain practices have been determined to be per se unlawful, 166
signifying the congressional determination that the activity has so
few redeeming qualities that it does not merit judicial effort to
discern whether a particular case is an exception to the rule. 67 Thus,
a demonstration that the defendant has engaged in a per se unlawful
activity is sufficient to impose liability under the antitrust laws. 68
One such practice is price-fixing, 69 which is the establishment of
164. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982); Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-
58 (1976); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (1982). "Although
not technically an 'antitrust' statute, the Federal Trade Commission Act is generally
directed at the same evils . .. ." 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1.14 at 31 n.7;
Federal Trade Commission Act 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (Unfair methods of competition
in commerce, and unfair or deceptive practices in commerce declared unlawful).
See generally L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 1-30 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as SULLIVAN].
165. See infra note 175 and accompanying text.
166. The Supreme Court has stated:
[The] principle of per se unreasonableness not only makes the type of
restraints which are proscribed by the Sherman Act more certain to the
benefit of everyone concerned, but it also avoids the necessity for an
incredibly complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the
entire history of the industry involved, as well as related industries, in
an effort to determine at large whether a particular restraint has been
unreasonable-an inquiry so often wholly fruitless when undertaken.
Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
167. See id.
168. See United States v. Trenton Potteries, Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927); see
also SULLIVAN, supra note 164, at 193-94. The Court has noted that several of
these practices include: price-fixing, United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150 (1940); division of markets, United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co.,
85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899); boycotts, Fashion
Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941); and tying arrange-
ments, International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
169. Price-fixing is the establishment of a market price by a competitor rather
than the forces of supply and demand. Price-fixing is defined as:
The cooperative setting of price levels or ranges by competing firms.
Such agreements are in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Price-
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prices by competitors rather than by the forces of supply and
demand.' 7 ° Price-fixing at either the vertical 7 ' or horizontal'7 2 stage
of production is condemned for two reasons. First, it impairs the
"freedom of the trader"' 73 to use his best judgment as to how to
fixing within the intent of Sherman Act is either horizontal (dealing with
arrangements among competitors) or vertical (attempting to control resale
price).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1070 (5th ed. 1979) (citing Knuth v. Erie-Crawford Dairy
Coop. Ass'n, 326 F. Supp. 48, 53 (D.C. Pa. 1971); aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
463 F.2d 470 (3d Cir. 1972); see also SULLIVAN, supra note 164, at 192-212.
170. See infra notes 174-76 and accompanying text.
171. Vertical price-fixing is called resale price maintenance (RPM). See SULLIVAN,
supra note 164, at 377-99. Vertical restraints are those between a buyer and a seller
in the chain of production and distribution as distingusished from a horizontal
agreement among competitors on the same level of production or distribution. See
id. Unless Congress has specifically exempted an area of resale price maintenance
from the reach of the Sherman Act, the practice of resale price maintenance is
per se unlawful. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968); Strauss v. Victor
Talking Mach. Co., 243 U.S. 490 (1917); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park
& Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
172. Horizontal price-fixing occurs when competitors on the same level of the
production-distribution ladder agree to sell at uniform prices. "Since Socony-Vacuum
it has been settled law ...that price-fixing among competitors is a per se violation
of Section 1 [of the Sherman Act]." SULLIVAN, supra note 162, at 198; see Goldfarb
v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975); Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1, (1958); United States v. Columbia Steel, Co., 334 U.S. 495 (1948). It
is obvious that actions taken by cartels to establish fixed anti-competitive prices
are per se unlawful. See Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S.
593 (1951) (foreign parent and subsidiary involved in price-fixing and territorial
restraints clearly within ambit of the Sherman Act). See also A. NEALE & D.
GOYDER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 331-36 (3d ed. 1980) [hereinafter
cited as NEALE & GOYDER] for a discussion of the Timken case. See also United
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927); United States v. Addyston
Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F. 271 (6th Cir. 1898), modified, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). While
the practice of combining or conspiring to establish fixed prices is illegal, "every
agreement among competitors which has some conceivable impact on price is not
per se unlawful." SULLIVAN, supra note 164, at 199 (citing Chicago-Board of Trade
v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918)). Thus courts look to the "purpose and
effect" of the activity to determine whether to apply the per se rule. In the final
analysis, "[t]he Act is not intended to make unlawful arrangements which affect
price by improving competition." SULLIVAN, supra note 164, at 200. In Chicago
Board of Trade the Court noted that, "[tihe true test of legality is whether the
restraint . . .merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether
it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition." 246 U.S. at 238. While
the Court noted that "good intentions" cannot save an unlawful restraint, a court
may look to the totality of factors, including intent, to determine the purpose and
effect of the restraint. See id.
173. When price-fixing occurs among competitors, they lose the freedom to
establish their own prices. The price making decision rests in the cartels hands or,
in the case of resale price maintenance, in the manufacturer. This inability to
evaluate and react to market forces runs contrary to the underpinnings of the
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compete in the marketplace.'7 4 Second, and more importantly, price
fixing allows competitors, rather than the "invisible hand" of the
marketplace, 75 to allocate scarce societal resources. 76
The main thrust of the antitrust laws is to foster an economic
environment wherein the forces of supply and demand determine
the price of any given good or service.' 77 This in turn will establish
the optimum level of production and, therefore, allocate scarce
societal resources most efficiently.' 7  Because price-fixing paralyzes
the nervous system of the economy, it is condemned outright as a
per se violation of the antitrust laws.'79
In the context of trademark regulation, the trademark necessarily
allows the competitor to exclude others from profiting from his
diligence and good will.'80 While this necessarily involves a restraint
Sherman Act. See 1 L. TOULMIN, ANTITRUST LAWS' 245 (1949); C. THOMPSON &
G. BRADY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ANTITRUST FUNDAMENTALS 8-11 (1974) [here-
inafter cited as THOMPSON & BRADY].
174. See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
175. The "invisible hand" refers to the concept of the forces of supply and
demand. See SULLIVAN, supra note 164, at 2-7. In a perfectly competitive market,
these forces will naturally bring about maximum allocative efficiency-the optimal
distribution of societal resources. See id. Price-fixing impedes this process by
distorting the movements of labor and capital. See id. The antitrust laws therefore
ban this artificial allocation of resources. See id; see also, NEALE & GOYDER, supra
note 172 at 41. Socony-Vacuum and Appalachian Coals are significant cases. In
Appalachian Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933), the Court was faced
with a factual situation similiar to that presented in Socony-Vacuum. In Appa-
lachian Coals defendant coal producer's market was glutted with excess coal. The
Depression had significantly altered demand for coal and the defendants formed
a joint selling agency to secure higher prices to " 'aid the industry in a measureable
recovery from its plight.' " NEALE & GOYDER, supra note 172, at 41. The Court
accepted the argument and dismissed the case. Id. at 42.
In Socony- Vacuum, the defendants were faced with excess gasoline supplies during
an economic downturn. Major gasoline producers banded together to purchase
excess supplies of gas to maintain price stability. The Court rejected the "self
help" argument which had been successful in Appalachian Coals. The Court,
therefore, eliminated any doubt as to whether defensive price-fixing would be an
absolute defense in an antitrust action. See NEALE & GOYDER, supra note 172, at
39-42.
176. See id.
177. See supra notes 164, 166, 175, 176 and accompanying text.
178. See supra note 175 and accompanying text.
179. See supra note 168 and accompanying text.
180. The rights one may obtain in a trademark or trade name can be viewed
as a monopoly of sorts, since others can be prevented from using the symbol. See
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 1:16, at 41 (trademarks not anti-competitive). However,
it should be noted that the proper terminology would not describe trademarks as
monopolies but rather as the embodiment of an exclusive right. See id. Other such
19861 TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING ACT
of trade,"8 ' the primary antitrust concern raised by the 1984 Act is
the potential abuse of the Act's strict remedies'82 to enforce resale
price maintenance programs.'83 A resale price maintenance program
is one in which the manufacturer seeks to establish the market price
at which a good is sold. 84 This is also known as vertical price
fixing.'85 Opponents of the 1984 Act argue that the extraordinary
remedies provided by the Act will be used by manufacturers to
harass, intimidate and eventually terminate price discounters.
8 6
The scenario envisioned by the opponents of the 1984 Act would
involve inquiries by manufacturers of trademark goods purchased
on the grey market 8 7 as to their source. A discount outlet dealing
in the "unauthorized goods" bearing the manufacturer's or exclusive
distributor's trademark may be served with ex parte seizure order
to determine the legitimacy of the goods. 88 Fearful of this entan-
glement, a price discounter may be forced to purchase his goods
through authorized distribution channels at higher costs, or to sell
his goods at authorized prices. 89 Opponents argue that this influence,
exclusive rights would include patents and copyrights. These rights enhance rather
than deter competition. As Judge Frank noted:
To denounce patents [and other forms of exclusive rights] merely because
they create monopolies is to indulge in superficial thinking. We may still
want our society to be fundamentally competitive. But there has seldom
been a society in which there have not been some monopolies, i.e., special
privileges. The legal and medical professions have their respective guild
monopolies. The owner of real estate, strategically located, has a mo-
nopoly; so has the owner of a valuable mine .... The problem is not
whether there should be monopolies, but, rather, what monopolies there
should be, and whether and how much they should be regulated.
Picard v. United Aircraft Corp., 128 F.2d 632, 643 (2d Cir.) (Frank, J., concurring),
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 651 (1942); see Standard Brands, Inc. v. Smidler, 151 F.2d
34 (2d Cir. 1945); Eastern Wine Corp. v. Winslow-Warren, Ltd., 137 F.2d 955
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 320 U.S. 758 (1943); see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 1,
§ 1:16, at 41 (trademarks enhance rather than chill competition). The majority of
courts and commentators have rejected the view that trademarks are monopolistic
devices. See generally Pattishall, Trademarks and the Monopoly Phobia, 50 MICH.
L. REV. 967 (1952) (analysis of trademark and antitrust law).
181. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
182. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text.
183. See supra note 42 and accompanying text.
184. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
185. See id.
186. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
187. A grey market good connotes a good which is produced in a foreign market
and imported and sold in the United States at lower prices than the same good
produced in the United States. For a discussion of the grey market, see infra notes
201-18 and accompanying text.
188. See infra notes 201-18 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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in the establishment of prices by the manufacturer, generates legitimate
antitrust concerns.
These fears may rest on unwarranted speculation. First, it is clear
that resale price maintenance is a per se violation of the Sherman
Act. 19° Congressional intent to foster competition in this area is
exemplified by the repeal of the McGuire Act.19' Under the McGuire
Act, resale price maintenance agreements sanctioned by state law
could, without violating the antitrust laws,1 92 be enforced against
190. See supra notes 165-70 and accompanying text. The Sherman Act prohibits:
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or
with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall
make any contract or engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby
declared to be illegal shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding one million dollars if
a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars,
or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punish-
ments, in the discretion of the court.
The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
See Keifer-Stuart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1967)
(maximum resale price ceilings established by distributors illegal). While the case
law in this area cogently supports the proposition that resale price maintenance is
illegal per se, this rule is subject to certain exceptions. See United States v. Colgate
& Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919). For example, the Colgate doctrine created a limited
exception to the per se ban on resale price maintenance. Under Colgate, a man-
ufacturer may, consistent with the Sherman Act, unilaterally refuse to deal with
a distributor or retailer who does not adhere to the manufacturer's suggested resale
price. In Colgate the Court stated that:
In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the
act does not restrict the long recognized right of a trader or manufacturer
engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own in-
dependent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal. And, of
course, he may announce in advance the circumstances under which he
will refuse to sell.
250 U.S. at 307; see United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290,
320 (1887). Thus, in certain circumstances, the business itself is free to exercise
"the right to sell." See id.; see also NEALE & GOYDER, supra note 172, at 254-
60; SULLIVAN, supra note 164, at 391-95; THOMPSON & BRADY, supra note 173, at
82-92.
191. The McGuire Act was repealed by Congress in 1975. McGuire Act, 4 ch.
745, 66 Stat. 631 (1952) repealed by Consumers Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub.
L. No. 94-145, § 3, 89 Stat. 801.
192. The McGuire Act was a species of Fair Trade Law. " 'Fair Trade' is the
term often used to describe resale price maintenance programs by supporters of
the practice; opponents talk of 'price rings.' Both terms have a good deal to be
desired semantically." SULLIVAN, supra note 164, at 261 n.1. The gradual movement
toward state passage of fair trade laws may have been caused, in part, by the
major Supreme Court cases condemning the activity. Id. at 260-61. Compare Colgate
v. United States, 250 U.S. 300 (1919) (Court interpreting narrow channel in which
company may refuse to deal with traders who refuse to adhere to announced resale
prices) with United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960) (approaching
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recalcitrant dealer who would not adhere to manufacturer's suggested price outside
Colgate doctrine). In light of the Supreme Court's decisions in this area, manu-
facturers simply could not safely install and maintain a resale price maintenance
program. See NEALE & GOYDER, supra note 172, at 256-57. Thus, "a strong
movement developed-especially among associations of small retailers in such trades
as proprietary drugs and cosmetics to achieve legislative recognition for "fair trade."
Id. at 261 (footnote omitted). Fair trade legislation legalized resale price maintenance
under state law. "The state laws, however, could not confer any immunity under
federal law, and where interstate commerce was affected resale price maintenance
might still run afoul of the Sherman Act." Id. at 262. Proponents of fair trade
laws sought and secured federal antitrust immunity for resale price maintenance.
This legislation is popularly known as the Miller-Tydings Act. The Miller-Tydings
Act, ch. 690, Title VIII, 50 Stat. 693 (1937) (repealed 1975). In its initial form,
this legislation sought to "except from coverage of Section 1 of Sherman agreements
prescribing minimum resale prices which were sanctioned by state law." SULLIVAN,
supra note 164, at 378.
Initially, questions concerning the legitimacy of the Miller-Tydings Amendment
centered on whether a manufacturer could enforce resale price standards against
retailers who had not signed an agreement with the manufacturer to sell at his
prices. These retailers were known as "non-signers." See Schwegmann Bros. v.
Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951). In Schwegmann, the Court rejected
the argument that Congress had intended to apply the Miller-Tydings Act to both
signers and non-signers alike. Rather, the Court noted that the plain wording of
the statute "exempted only 'contracts and agreements' from the general prohibition
of the Sherman Act." Because the plaintiff in Schwegmann had not signed an
agreement, the amendment did not exempt the resale price maintenance from liability
under section I of the Sherman Act. Id. at 393-95; see also NEALE & GOYDER,
supra note 172, at 263.
Subsequent to Schwegmann, Congress made a concerted effort to overrule the
decision by specifically expanding antitrust immunity to exclude the enforcement
of resale price maintenance against non-signers from Sherman liability. This leg-
islation, the Federal Fair Trade Act of 1952, was popularly known as the McGuire
Act and expanded the breadth of Sherman immunity. See The McGuire Act, 15
U.S.C. § 45(a), (repealed 1975). The McGuire Act overruled the Schwegmann
decision. Thus, antitrust immunity was extended to the enforcement of resale price
maintenance programs against non-signers and signers alike:
(a) (2) Nothing contained in this section or in any of the Antitrust Acts
shall render unlawful any contracts or agreements prescribing minimum
or stipulated prices, or requiring a vendee to enter into contracts or
agreements prescribing minimum or stipulated prices, for the resale of
a commodity which bears, the trade-mark . . . of such commodity and
which is in free and open competition with commodities of the same
general class produced or distributed by others ....
(3) Nothing contained in this section or in any of the Antitrust Acts
shall render unlawful the exercise or the enforcement of any right or
right of action created by any statute, law, or public policy . . . which
in substance provides that willfully and knowingly advertising, offering
for sale, or selling any commodity at less than the price or prices prescribed
in such contracts or agreements whether the person so advertising, offering
for sale, or selling is or is not a party to such a contract or agreement,
is unfair competition and is actionable at the suit of any person damaged
thereby.
The McGuire Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1952) (emphasis added). The McGuire Act also
"[exempted from federal antitrust scrutiny] stipulated as well as minimum prices,
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non-signers and signers alike."" Moveover, the agreements could
provide for stipulated as well as minimum prices and could oblige
the buyer to impose similar restrictions on the resale of non-con-
sumption goods. 194 Now, unless specifically exempted by Congress,
"all resale price maintenance agreements within the reach of federal
law are unlawful under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.'1 95
The 1984 Act does not alter the illegal per se status of resale
price maintenance programs under the Sherman Act. 196 In fact, the
1984 Act may even decrease the possibility of a manufacturer in-
stalling and maintaining a resale price maintenance program. 97 The
1984 Act specifically provides for the award of damages and at-
torney's fees to a defendant who is wrongfully subjected to an ex
parte seizure order. 98 Moreover, the defendant may be awarded
damages. Given these remedies, and the exclusion of grey market
goods from the 1984 Act's definition of counterfeit mark, 99 it is
clear that Congress intended to enhance competition at the distri-
bution level of the marketplace, not to impede it. Congressional
acknowledgement in the 1984 Act of the potential danger of resale
price maintenance programs and the irrefutable fact that Sherman
Act liability remains unchanged, lead to the conclusion that the 1984
Act does not generate an increased risk of antitrust violations.2z°
and could oblige the buyer to impose like restrictions on resale other than for
consumption." SULLIVAN, supra note 164, at 379. The Miller-Tydings Act applies
to minimum prices. Id. Thus, full federal exemption for resale price maintenance
had been acheived. The courts upheld the legislation. See Hudson Distribs., Inc.
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 377 U.S. 386, 395 (1963); General Elec. Co. v. Hess Bros.,
Inc., 155 F. Supp. 57 (E.D. Pa. 1957).
193. See supra note 192.
194. See supra note 192.
195. See SULLIVAN, supra note 164, at 379; NEALE & GOYDER, supra note 172,
at 260-65.
196. See SULLIVAN, supra note 164, at 379; NEALE & GOYDER, supra note 172,
at 265.
197. The 1984 Act did not amend the antitrust laws of the United States. See
supra note 31.
198. The legislative history of the 1984 Act delineates congressional recognition
of the dangers of resale price maintenance. Coupled with the 1984 Act's remedies
for victims of unwarranted seizures, denotes Congress' heightened resolve to prohibit
resale price maintenance programs. See id. Arguably, this augmentation of defensive
remedies will act to enhance competition in the vertical markets. See supra notes
194-96 and accompanying text.
199. See infra notes 201-18 and accompanying text.
200. This conclusion flows naturally from the legislative history of the 1984 Act.
See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 201-18 and
accompanying text.
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C. The Importation and Distribution of Grey Market Goods
Under the Trademark Counterfeiting Act of 1984
Another area of trade and commerce which may be adversely
affected by the 1984 Act is that of the importation and distribution
of "grey market" goods,2"' that is, goods produced in foreign coun-
tries and sold in the United States.202 Typically, the transaction
involves the overseas purchase of goods bearing the registered trade-
mark of a manufacturer and imported into the United States to be
sold at a price lower than that of the exclusive domestic distributor. 03
The sale is "unauthorized" in that the transaction does not involve
both the trademark owner and his domestic distributor . 204 The goods,
however, are bona fide merchandise.20 1
It has been argued that the importation and marketing of parallel
imports in the grey market 2°6 may trigger unwarranted litigation
201. Grey market and parallel imports are goods that "[are] legitimately produced
... [and] are imported without the authorization of the trademark or copyright
holder." W. Goebel Porzellanfabrik v. Action Indus., Inc., 589 F. Supp. 763, 764
n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Parfums Stern, Inc. v. United States Custom Serv., 575 F.
Supp. 416, 418 (S.D. Fla. 1983).
A grey market is created when an arbitrageur takes advantage of a price difference
between the two markets by buying in the market where prices are lower and
selling in the market where prices are higher. See Parfums Stern, 575 F. Supp. at
418. A typical fact pattern may be stated as follows: If an American manufacturer
licenses a foreign producer to produce and/or market trademarked widgets in
France, may an arbitrageur purchase these goods in France and redistribute them
in the United States, although he does not have the express permission of the
trademark owner to participate in the American market? Apparently, merchants
may engage in such activity without violating the Lanham Act. Parfums Stern,
575 F. Supp. at 418-19; accord Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co.,
719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983); Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 1419
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), aff'd, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 54
U.S.L.W. 3460 (Jan. 13, 1986).
202. Bell & Howell contains a typical fact pattern. The district court framed the
issue as:
[W]hether an American company [BHMC], which is engaged on an
exclusive basis in the business of importing and selling trademarked goods
of foreign manufacture under United States trademark rights owned by
it, may enjoin another's [Masel's] unauthorized, competitive sale in the
United States of the same identically trademarked goods, which were
made and placed in the stream of international commerce by the foreign
manufacturer [Mamiya Co.], who did not intend that such goods be sold
here.
Bell & Howell: Mamiya Co. v. Masel Supply Co., 548 F. Supp. 1063, 1064-65
(E.D.N.Y. 1982), vacated, 719 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1983).
203. See Bell & Howell, 719 F.2d at 43-44.
204. See supra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
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under the 1984 Act.207 Fearful that the marketing of these goods
may be characterized as counterfeit trafficking, and thus constitute
proscribed conduct,0 8 opponents of the 1984 Act have expressed
concern that the price-cutting department store may be crippled by
repetitive suits brought under the 1984 Act. 209
There are competing societal interests regarding the distribution
of unauthorized grey market goods. Society benefits from the price
competition generated by the importation and distribution of legit-
imate merchandise at lower prices.2 '0 In fact, one court noted that
to restrain the importation and distribution of "equally good, yet
less expensive" products would disserve the public interest.2"' Trade-
mark owners and their distributors argue, however, that the importa-
tion of grey market goods impinges upon their right to control the
distribution of goods bearing their trademark. 1 2
207. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. See infra note 211 and accompanying text.
211. Parfums Stern, 575 F. Supp. at 421. Moreover, the Parfums Stern court
noted that in the majority of instances, the trademark owner himself places the
goods in the international stream of commerce. Id. at 419. The goods return to
American markets, but not by illegal means. See id. Rather, arbitrageurs take
advantage of international price differences and merely import the goods and sell
them in the United States. While the trademark owner is "harmed" in that he is
not insulated from price competition, he still retains his royalty earnings on the
foreign sale. In fact, "there is no evasion of legal rights." Id. Indeed, it is the
trademark owner's expenditure on advertising which, in part, creates the grey market.
See supra notes 8-15 and accompanying text. As one court noted, the grey market
is a "complete circle" in that the trademark owner's goods return to harm it in
the United States. Parfums Stern, 575 F. Supp. at 419.
212. The fact pattern of Vivitar Corp. v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 1419 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1984), aff'd, 761 F.2d 1552 (Fed. Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 54 U.S.L.W.
3460 (Jan. 13, 1986), delineates the conflicting interests involved in grey market
good importation and distribution. The plaintiff, Vivitar Corp., was an Amercian
manufacturer of cameras. It licensed foreign subsidiaries to manufacture cameras
bearing its trademark. Through its licensing agreements with these subsidiaries,
plaintiff restricted their access to its home market. By restricting the subsidiaries'
access to its home market, plaintiff sought to insulate itself from price competition.
Third parties or arbitrageurs, however, purchased the foreign subsidiaries' products
overseas and imported them into the United States. This introduction of competing,
yet identical, goods eroded plaintiff's ability to maintain higher prices. See Vivitar
Corp., 585 F. Supp. at 1421. Vivitar, naturally, sought to invoke federal regulatory
schemes to protect its market advantage in the home market. Plaintiff contended
that these importations were illegal under the Tariff Act without its consent. The
Tariff Act reads in relevant part:
[lI]t shall be unlawful to import into the United States any merchandise
of foreign manufacitire if such merchandise, or the label . . . bears a
trademark owned by a citizen of, or by a corporation ... created or
organized within, the United States, and registered in the Patent and
Trademark Office ... unless written consent of the owner of such
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The 1984 Act does not threaten the importation and marketing
of parallel imports. 21 3 Furthermore, participation in the grey market
does not generate an increased risk of trademark litigation under
the 1984 Act. 214 The marketing of grey market goods may actually
further the goals of the Act by providing an increased supply of
legitimate products for consumers at lower prices.2"5 This would
protect the consumer from the dangers inherent in counterfeit goods
by increasing the supply of legitimate goods. 2 6 Furthermore, Congress
has expressly stated that grey market goods are excluded from the
Act's definition of counterfeit goods. 1 7 Also, Congress intended to
trademark is produced at the time of making entry .... (b) Any such
merchandise imported into the United States in violation of the provisions
of this section shall be subject to seizure and forefeiture for violation
of the customs laws.
The Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1526(a), (b) (1982) (originally enacted as Act
of June 17, 1930, ch. 497, tit. IV, § 526, 46 Stat. 741).
In Vivitar, however, the district court noted that the "Customs Service" interprets
subsections (a) and (b) of section 1526 to deny trademark owners the right to
require exclusion of trademarked goods manufactured abroad when the trademark
owner has authorized the foreign manufacturer to apply the trademark to the goods.
Vivitar Corp., 585 F. Supp. at 1421. The Customs Service interpreted Customs
Regulations as permitting this importation. See id. The district court, noting that
the importation of goods is a matter of international trade law, concluded that it
had jurisdiction to hear the case. Vivitar Corp., 585 F. Supp. at 1425. The court
stated "[t]he central issue in this case is the regulation of international trade in
goods bearing genuine trademarks, rather than trademark law." Id. at 1423. If
the goods in issue bear legitimate trademarks, issues of importation and distribution
of these goods should not be resolved under the 1984 Act. See infra note 213 and
accompanying text.
213. See supra note 212. This conclusion is based on two precepts. First, grey
market goods do not trigger Lanham Act liability. "Trademark infringement is
consistently defined in trademark law as the use of reproductions, copies, counterfeits
or colorable imitations of genuine trademarks". . . . Vivitar Corp., 585 F. Supp.
at 1423 (emphasis added); see The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114, 1118, 1124,
1127 (1982). A grey market good bears a genuine trademark. Therefore, the Lanham
Act is the inappropriate body of federal law to regulate the importation of grey
market goods. Second, the 1984 Act's language excludes goods bearing authorized
trademarks from its definition of counterfeit goods. See supra note 131.
Moreover, the 1984 Act's legislative history confirms that the importation and
distribution of grey market goods do not constitute proscribed conduct. "[T]he
bill does not reach trafficking in authentic goods that have been obtained from
overseas markets and imported into the United States-so-called "gray market
goods" . . . since the trademark on such goods was placed there with the au-
thorization of the trademark owner .... [The Committee] does not consider such
goods counterfeit for purposes of this legislation." S. REP. No. 98-526, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1, I1, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3627, 3637.
214. See S. REP. No. 98-526, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 11, reprinted in 1984 U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3627, 3637; supra note 213 and accompanying text.
215. See supra note 211 and accompanying text.
216. See id.
217. See supra notes 154, 213 and accompanying text.
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exclude unauthorized overruns from the Act's definition of coun-
terfeit goods. 21 1
Therefore, the following rule of construction should apply in future
suits brought under the 1984 Act: if the goods in question have
their genesis in legitimate production, whether foreign or domestic,
their sale does not fall within the ambit of proscribed conduct under
the Act. Since grey market goods are produced with the consent of
the trademark owner, their distribution is not proscribed. The grey
market, therefore, should continue to function unimpeded in the
wake of the 1984 Act.
IV. Due Process and Its Application and Proper Scope
in Trademark Litigation: the Balancing of Interests
A. Introduction
Procedural due process 19 has been considered extremely important
to the overall scheme of justice220 throughout its development by
218. In many instances a manufacturer licenses a separate manufacturer to produce
goods bearing his trademark. Overruns are merchandise which bear the trademark
but are produced without the trademark owner's permission. In other words, a
manufacturer who produces beyond the quota established by the trademark owner
produces overruns. See supra note 154 and accompanying text. The production of
these goods, while illegal, does not constitute marketing in counterfeit goods as
contemplated by the 1984 Act. See id.
219. Procedural due process is a constitutional term of art without a concrete
definition. Rather, the term embodies a concept of American jurisprudence. Due
process is rooted in the fifth amendment of the Constitution. Therein it is stated:
"[n]o person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law ...... U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1. The fourteenth amendment of the
Constitution also incorporates into the concept of due process: "[nior shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law
.... U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
These procedural safeguards have their roots in the notion that "conditions of
personal freedom can be preserved only when there is some institutional check on
arbitrary government action." L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 501 (1979);
see also Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey
and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 340 (1957).
220. While procedural due process is an amorphous term, certain rights and
liberties have defined its parameters. One such right is the right to be heard prior
to the commencement of judicial proceedings. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water
Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 20 (1978); Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149,
156 (1978); Carey v. Sugar, 425 U.S. 73, 77 (1976) (per curiam); Gerstein v. Pugh,
420 U.S. 103, 127 (1975) (Stewart, J., concurring); Pirolo v. City of Clearwater,
711 F.2d 1006, 1016-19 (lth Cir. 1983); Buller v. Buechler, 706 F.2d 844, 847
n.4 (8th Cir. 1983); Reed v. Village of Shorewood, 704 F.2d 943, 949 (7th Cir.
1983); Lewis Serv. Center, Inc. v. Mack Fin. Corp., 696 F.2d 66, 69 (8th Cir.
1982); Amstar Corp. v. S/S Alevandros T., 664 F.2d 904, 906-13 (4th Cir. 1981);
Valley Fin. v. United States, 629 F.2d 162, 170 (D.D.C. 1980), cert. denied, 451
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the Supreme Court. 221 The due process clause is based on the belief
that it is fundamentally unfair to deprive an individual of a life,
222
liberty 2 3 or property2 24 interest without first having notified that
individual of the pendency of the action and granting him an op-
portunity to be heard. 225 However, the opportunity to be heard is
not an absolute right. 226 In certain limited circumstances, notice to
a defendant may retard, rather than promote, the cause of justice. 227
Notice should not be given in situations where the defendant will
flee the jurisdiction or destroy the subject matter of the action. 2 1
In trademark litigation, the issue of notice is paramount. It has
been argued that the Act's provision for ex parte relief 229 imper-
missibly impinges upon constitutionally guaranteed rights.
2 0
U.S. 1018 (1981); Mohawk Excavating, Inc. v. OS & H, 549 F.2d 859, 862 (2d
Cir. 1977).
221. See Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516, 535-36 (1884).
222. See supra note 219.
223. See id.
224. See id.
225. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 557-58 (1974) (some kind of notice
necessary to comport with due process standards); Joint Anti-Facist Refugee Comm.
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 168 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (same); Grannis
v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914) (underpinning of due process is opportunity
to be heard); McVeigh v. United States, 78 U.S. 259, 267 (1870) (right to notice
and hearing).
226. The Supreme Court has recognized that "[efx parte temporary restraining
orders are no doubt necessary in certain circumstances .... " Granny Goose Foods,
Inc. v. Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974); see Carroll v. President and Com-
missioners of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 180 (1968) ("[t]here is a place in our
jurisprudence for ex parte issuance, without notice. ); In re Vuitton et Fils,
S.A., 606 F.2d 1, 4 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
227. A typical fact pattern involves a manufacturer's efforts to restrain a coun-
terfeiter from distributing counterfeit merchandise. If notice is given to the coun-
terfeiter, he might remove himself and/or the merchandise beyond the jurisdiction
of the court, sell the merchandise to innocent third parties, or destroy it (and
hence the evidence of the crime). Notice in this situation would disserve rather
than promote the cause of justice.
As one court has noted, "[i]f notice is required, that notice all too often appears
to serve only to render fruitless further prosecution of the action. This is precisely
contrary to the normal and intended role of 'notice' . .. .'" Vuitton et Fils S.A.,
606 F.2d at 5 (court notes that in appropriate case involving counterfeit goods ex
parte seizure order should issue); accord Vuitton et Fils, S.A. v. Carousel Handbags,
592 F.2d 126, 129 n.5 (2d Cir. 1979) (same).
228. See supra note 227 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 31 for a definition of counterfeit good.
230. An individual possesses a constitutionally guaranteed right to enjoy the use
of his personal property. See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text. An ex
parte seizure order, which necessarily deprives the citizen of his possessory interest
in the property, clearly raises constitutional issues. See, e.g., North Georgia Fin-
ishings, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,
416 U.S. 600 (1974); Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
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Opponents of the 1984 Act, who envision overly zealous com-
petitors using ex parte relief to stifle legitimate competition, argue
that the statute must be redrawn to authorize suppression of coun-
terfeit goods only."' Failure to do so, opponents argue, will result
in an anti-competitive environment. 232 However, an examination of
the legislative history of the 1984 Act, coupled with an analysis of
the ex parte seizure order in the federal courts, suggest that this
provisional remedy will not work constitutional deprivations in future
trademark cases .233
B. Ex Parte Relief: A Historical Perspective
The ex parte seizure order2 14 derives from the ancient common
231. See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
232. See id.
233. See infra notes 266-309 and accompanying text.
234. Seizure orders will be considered in the context of both the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure and federal case law. While there are state rules of civil procedure
for ex parte relief, this issue will not be considered herein. In cases involving
counterfeit trademarked merchandise, a court may order its seizure pursuant to
the Lanham Act. The applicable section reads in pertinent part:
In any action arising under this chapter, in which a violation of any
right of the registrant of a mark registered in the Patent and Trademark
Office shall have been established, the court may order that all labels,
signs, prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles, and advertisements in the
possession of the defendant, bearing the registered mark or any repro-
duction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation thereof, and all plates,
molds, matrices, and other means of making the same, shall be delivered
up and destroyed.
The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1118 (1982).
[WJith respect to a violation that consists of using a counterfeit mark
in connection with the sale, offering for sale, or distribution of goods
or services, the court may, upon ex parte application, grant an order
... providing for the seizure of goods and counterfeit marks involved
in such violation and the means of making such marks, and records
documenting the manufacture, sale, or receipt of things involved in such
violation.
15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(l)(A) (Supp. 1985).
The addition of the words "records documenting the manufacture, sale, or receipt
of things involved in such violation" is extremely important. Under the Lanham
Act prior to its amendment, the seizure of business records was not specifically
authorized. See Bainton, supra note 16, at 462. Plaintiffs, therefore, could not
readily establish the volume of counterfeiting perpetrated by defendant. Thus,
plaintiffs had "no realistic hope of recovering the counterfeiter's profits in civil
litigation." Id. at 462. The new statutory predicate for seizing business records is
intended to eliminate this result.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b) governs the granting of ex parte relief.
It reads in pertinent part:
A temporary restraining order may- be granted without written or oral
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law writ of replevin.235 Replevin is a provisional remedy deeply rooted
in the common law history of the United States,23 6 whose goal is
to restore possession of a disputed chattel to the plaintiff during
the pendency of the action.23 7 An action in replevin, which is an
action at law, is predicated on the defendant's wrongful taking and
possession of a chattel and the existence of a superior possessory
interest in the plaintiff.238
The ex parte seizure order, the analog to the writ of replevin, is
codified at Rule 65(b)219 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The goal of the modern ex parte seizure order is to preserve the
notice to the adverse party or his attorney only if (1) it clearly appears
from specific facts shown by affidavit or by the verified complaint that
immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the
applicant before the adverse party or his attorney can be heard in
opposition, and (2) the applicant's attorney certifies to the court in
writing the efforts, if any, which have been made to give the notice and
the reasons supporting his claim that notice should not be required.
FED. R. Civ. P. 65(b); see Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423,
439 (1974); see also In re Vuitton et Fils S.A., 606 F.2d 1, 3-4 (2d Cir. 1979)
(per curiam); P. Daussa Corp. v. Sutton Cosmetics (P.R.) Inc., 462 F.2d 134, 136
(2d Cir. 1972); Robert Stigwood Group Ltd. v. Sperber, 457 F.2d 50, 55 (2d Cir.
1972). See generally Note, Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L.
REV. 994, 1060 (1965).
235. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 78-79 (1972); see also J. COBBEY, LAW
OF REPLEVIN 27-47 (2d ed. 1900) [hereinafter cited as COBBEY]; 2 F. POLLOCK &
F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 577-78 (2d ed. 1959) [hereinafter cited as
POLLOCK & MAITLAND].
236. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 78-79.
237. See id.
238. While it is clear that there exists a similarity between the common law writ
of replevin and modern statutory seizure orders, there are dissimilarities as well.
As the Court noted in Fuentes, there exists a distinction between the wrongful
possession of a chattel and the wrongful taking of the chattel. In the former, an
action in replevin would lie, whereas in the latter it would not. See Fuentes, 407
U.S. at 79-80. Replevin at common law is a form of action employed to regain
possession of personal chattels which have been wrongfully taken from the plaintiff.
See COBBEY, supra note 235, at 29.
239. Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65(b) encompasses requests
for injunctions. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
CIVIL § 2941 (1973) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT & MILLER]. Thus it is important
to distinguish the temporary restraining order from the injunction:
Applicants for injunctive relief occasionally are faced with the possibility
that irreparable injury will occur before the hearing for a preliminary
injunction required by Rule 65(a) can be held. In that event a temporary
restraining order may be available under Rule 65(b). The order is designed
to preserve the status quo until there is an opportunity to hold a hearing
on the application for a preliminary injunction and may be issued with
or without notice to the adverse party.
Id. at § 2951. For a judicial discussion of ex parte seizure orders issued pursuant
to Rule 65(b), see Vuitton et Fils S.A., 606 F.2d at 2-4.
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status quo ante. 240 This goal is especially important in trademark
litigation. Should notice serve to "alert" the defendant to an im-
pending civil action, he may flee the jurisdiction or otherwise render
it impossible to obtain meaningful judgment. 241 Thus, the preservation
of the status quo is at the heart of both the modern and the ancient
remedial procedures .242
C. The Ex Parte Seizure Order in the Federal Courts:
Procedural Aspects
A temporary restraining order may be issued ex parte when the
court determines that a showing of immediate and irreparable harm
and specific facts which support a demand for foregoing notice have
been made.2 43 Under the new amendment authorizing ex parte sei-
zures, the standards resemble those required by Rule 65(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.244 From a procedural viewpoint,
these elements are readily established when a plaintiff seeks to restrain
a blatant commercial counterfeiter. A court, therefore, should use
Rule 65(b) and its interpretation by the federal courts in construing
the 1984 Act.
1. Immediate and Irreparable Harm
A showing by the plaintiff of a threat of irreparable harm is a
prerequisite of equity jurisdiction.2 4  The plaintiff must make a
showing of the inadequacy of the remedy at law to invoke the court's
240. See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 239, at § 2951; see also Sampson v.
Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 85-87 (1974); Vuitton et Fils S.A., 606 F.2d at 3; Pan
Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Flight Eng'rs' Int'l Ass'n, 306 F.2d 840, 842 (2d Cir.
1962); Jews for Urban Justice v. Wilson, 311 F. Supp. 1158, 1159 (D.D.C. 1970).
241. One court has labeled this scenario a "shell game" which causes great
expense and damage to the plaintiff. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 606 F.2d at 2. Therein
the court stated:
If after Vuitton has identified a counterfeiter with an inventory of fake
merchandise, that counterfeiter is permitted to dispose of that merchandise
with relative impunity after he learns of the imminence of litigation but
before he is enjoined from doing so, Vuitton's trademark enforcement
program will be stymied and the community of counterfeiters will be
permitted to continue to play its "shell game" at great expense and
damage to Vuitton.
Id.
242. See supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text.
243. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(b); supra note 234.
244. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
245. See 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 1, § 30:18 at 488; L. CURzoN, EQUITY 59
(3d ed. 1979).
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equity jurisdiction.2 6 Money damages are generally inadequate in a
trademark counterfeiting action for two reasons. First, counterfeiting
is a business tort in which the injury is to a commercial interest
rather than personal, bodily injury.2 47 The plaintiff must, therefore,
come forward with evidence to establish a basis on which to rest
his damage claim . 48 The amount of damages prayed for cannot be
entirely speculative.2 49 This burden of proof is one that most victims
of commercial counterfeiting cannot sustain. 2 0 Thus, money damages
at law are inadequate. Second, the trademark owner's goodwill, a
unique business asset, is damaged when imitation merchandise bearing
his mark is sold. 25 If the defendant's goods are of inferior quality,
plaintiff's professional reputation will be tarnished.252 The destruction
of this unique asset is also not readily calculable in money damages. 253
It is in cases of blatant commercial counterfeiting that this leg of
Rule 65(b) 254 is readily established.
2. Establishing Why Notice is Not Required in Commercial
Counterfeiting
The second requirement of ex parte relief in the federal courts is
a showing that notice is not required.255 In commercial counterfeiting
246. See supra note 245 and accompanying text.
247. A business tort injures an economic rather than a personal interest Trademark
infringement was treated in the First Restatement of Torts under the heading
Confusion of Source. However, as Dean Prosser has noted, "[trademark infringe-
ment has] been omitted from the Second Restatement as being no longer sufficiently
identified with Tort law." W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, TORTS 1209
(7th ed. 1982); see G. ALEXANDER, COMMERCIAL TORTS 169-72 (1973).
248. See Seizure Orders, supra note 16, at 462.
249. Id.
250. See Seizure Orders, supra note 16, at 462; Vuitton et Fils S.A. v. Crown
Handbags, 492 F. Supp. 1071 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff'd, 622 F.2d 577 (2d Cir. 1980).
Congress sought to alleviate this problem by enacting the recent Lanham Act
amendment. Congress has specifically provided for the seizure of the defendant's
business records. See 15 U.S.C. § 1116(d)(l)(A) (Supp. 1985). Plaintiff will be
much more likely to establish damages with sufficient certainty-one of the congres-
sional goals in enacting this legislation. See S. REP. No. 98-526, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1, 15, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3627, 3642.
251. It has been noted that "[iut is widely recognized that trademark infringement
inflicts irreparable injury upon the trademark owner, because it adversely affects
the reputation, and thus the good will, of the trademark owner." Seizure Orders,
supra note 16, at 472-73.
252. See id.
253. See supra notes 250-52 and accompanying text.
254. See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
255. See id.
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cases, this element is also readily established.25 6 There are two prin-
ciple reasons why notice, which should not be used to frustrate the
cause of justice, should not issue in commercial counterfeiting cases.
First, in many instances, the plaintiff must act quickly in order to
protect the public from imminent harm. 217 Seizure of dangerous
counterfeit goods is appropriate because the goods often constitute
a threat to public welfare in se.2 11 Second, the seizure of the coun-
terfeit goods and the defendant's business records are inextricably
linked to the plaintiff's securing a final and meaningful judgment. 25 9
C. Distinguishing Borderline Cases: Why The Act's Ex Parte
Seizure Provisions Do Not Impinge Upon Legitimate Business
Practices
Ex parte orders are extraordinary remedies.26 By definition, their
issuance should be stringently limited.2 61 When examining whether
a plaintiff has made a prima facie showing that notice is not required,
several factors should be examined. First, a court should determine
if there is a less onerous alternative to effectuate the plaintiff's
needs. 262 Second, the court should examine whether the defendant
256. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
258. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of the dangers
posed by counterfeit goods.
259. The plaintiff must obtain the defendant's business records if he is to secure
the evidence necessary to meet his burden of proving damages. See supra notes
241, 247-54 and accompanying text for a discussion of the plaintiff's burden in
establishing a damage claim.
260. The legislative history of the 1984 Act indicates that "[tihe Committee
recognize[d] that, ex parte seizure orders are an extraordinary remedy, which must
be used sparingly and only as needed." S. REP. No. 98-526, 98th Cong., 2d Sess.
1, 15, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3627, 3642.
261. "In general, 'ex parte proceedings ... have never been favored by the
law.' " Note, Temporary Restraining Orders, 40 Ky. L.J. 98, 98 (1951-1952);
Vuitton et Fils, 606 F.2d at 4-5.
262. A host of alternative remedies exist which may effectuate the plaintiff's
needs. Tactically, it may be wise for the plaintiff to refrain from seeking the most
judicially unpalatable remedy, the ex parte seizure order, unless absolutely necessary.
As one practitioner has noted, "[the arsenal in trademark counterfeiting cases is
formidable . . . the attorney, therefore, should never ask for more than he needs."
Seizure Orders, supra note 16, at 468. Bainton cites the following remedies as
viable alternatives to the ex parte seizure order:
I. A preliminary injunction brought on for hearing by regular notice of
motion.
2. A preliminary injunction brought on by order to show cause.
3. A preliminary injunction brought on for hearing by order to show
cause coupled with a temporary restraining order entered after giving
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is a proper subject for an ex parte order. 63 Several factors should
be considered. The court should investigate whether the defendant
runs a transient operation. 264 The court should also determine whether
the defendant has a good faith reason to believe the goods in question
are indeed legitimate. 265 Blatant counterfeiters could not meet this
burden.
the defendant notice of presentation of the application for the temporary
restraining order and an opportunity to be heard.
4. A preliminary injunction brought on for hearing by order to show
cause coupled with a temporary restraining order issued ex parte.
5. A preliminary injunction brought on for hearing by order to show
cause coupled with (a) a temporary restraining order issued ex parte, (b)
an order sealing the file pending service of the order to show cause and
temporary restraining order.
6. A preliminary injunction brought on for hearing by order to show
cause coupled with (a) a temporary restraining order issued ex parte, (b)
an order sealing the file pending service of the order to show cause and
temporary restraining order, and (c) an order directing the United States
Marshall or one of his deputies to enter the defendant's premises and
seize and impound all infringing articles, all devices used to manufacture
or advertise such infringing articles, and all books, records and other
documents which related to such infringing articles.
7. A preliminary injunction brought on for hearing by order to show
cause coupled with (a) a temporary restraining order issued ex parte, (b)
an order sealing the file pending service of the order to show cause and
temporary retraining order, and (c) an order directing the United States
Marshall or one of his deputies to use such reasonable force as the
circumstances warrant to gain entrance to the defendant's premises and
seize and impound all infringing articles, and all books, records and
other documents which relate to such infringing articles.
Id. at 468-69.
263. It is clear that the restraint of transient defendants is one of the primary
purposes in seeking an ex parte order. See Vuitton et Fils S.A., 606 F.2d at 2-3.
Congress sought to limit the potential abuse of the 1984 Act's remedies by articulating
which "type" of defendants it believed to be the proper target of ex parte relief.
For example, the Committee noted, "[we do] not believe that it would be appropriate
to issue an ex parte seizure order when the defendant is a reputable merchant,
absent unusual circumstances." S. REP. No. 98-526, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 8,
reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3627, 3634. The Committee incorporated
as a "general principle" that ex parte orders should focus mainly on the Vuitton
type criminal." Id. (emphasis added). For a discussion of the problems faced by
plaintiff in establishing a reasonable damage figure, see supra notes 247-50 and
accompanying text.
264. See supra note 263 and accompanying text.
265. The 1984 Act is designed to contain a "safe harbor" provision from both
civil and criminal liability. S. REP. No. 98-526, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 8, reprinted
in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 3627, 3639. Congress outlined two steps
which preclude liability under the 1984 Act. First, the concerned party may notify
a trademark owner by actual written notice of his intent to use a similar mark.
See id. Second, the party may affix a label on his goods disclaiming any connection
with the owner of the registered mark. See id. A party's failure to comply with
these two steps does not necessarily establish liability. See id.
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By examining these factors to determine whether the plaintiff has
met the procedural requirements of the 1984 Act, 266 a court can
more readily effectuate the goals of the 1984 Act which was not in-
tended to replace all prior trademark procedures.267 If the aforemen-
tioned good faith factors are present,268 then the plaintiff should be
denied an ex parte order for having failed to establish why an ex
parte order is warranted. 269 Thus, legitimate business practices should
not be impeded by the issuance of ex parte orders. Moreover, in ap-
plying a due process balancing test to the competing interests involv-
ed, the societal interest in arresting the problem of commercial
counterfeiting simply outweighs the counterfeiter's possessory interest
in his chattels.27 °
V. The Proper Scope of Due Process in Trademark Litigation
A. Introduction
Due process reflects the belief that a fair and just society must
protect the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which are
the underpinnings of jurisprudence. 271 Therefore, a different bal-
ancing test should be employed in the area of trademark law when
an individual tortiously usurps the property rights of another.272
While society must protect the recognized rights and liberties of its
members procedurally, a balancing of the competing interests tips
decisively in favor of the trademark owner who seeks to restrain
those engaged in the destruction of his good will.2 73 Due process
266. See supra notes 243-59 and accompanying text.
267. Congress emphasized that the 1984 Act does not reach cases of innocent
infringement. Rather, other bodies of federal law, such as the Lanham Act and
the Tariff Act may cover these situations. See S. Rep. No. 98-526, 98th Cong.,
2d Sess. 1, 12, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3627, 3638.
268. See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
269. See supra notes 263-65 and accompanying text.
270. See infra notes 311-43 and accompanying text.
271. For a discussion of due process, see supra notes 219-27 and accompanying
text. As Justice Stewart noted, "[for more than a century the central meaning of
procedural due process has been clear: 'Parties whose rights are to be affected are
entitled to be heard; and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first
be notified.' " Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. at 80 (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68
U.S. 223, 233 (1863)).
272. This conclusion flows naturally from judicial interpretation of the due process
clause. The Supreme Court has examined the issue of ex parte relief in a series
of cases involving debtor-creditor relationships. See, e.g., id.
273. Commercial counterfeiting has been elevated to a federal crime by the 1984
Act. See supra note 31.
[Vol. XIV
TRADEMARK COUNTERFEITING ACT
should not be interpreted so as to unduly shield activities such as
commercial counterfeiting from judicial scrutiny.27 4 The property
interest of the counterfeiter is surely outweighed by the societal
interest in protecting consumers from the attendant ills of commercial
counterfeiting .275
In the absence of Supreme Court guidance on the issue of what
process is due in trademark counterfeiting litigation,2 76 a balancing
test which greatly favors the trademark owner can be inferred. 277
Federal courts addressing due process standards in counterfeit good
seizures 278 have generally relied on a body of Supreme Court precedent
annunciated in several cases involving debtor-creditor relationships.
In Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.2 79 and Fuentes v. Shevin, 280
the Supreme Court analyzed what constitutional limitations should
be placed on state remedies available to creditors in pre-judgment
seizure statutes. In finding the statutes involved in both Sniadach
and Fuentes constitutionally defective,2 1 the Court articulated a due
process standard which mandated, absent a showing of a compelling
state interest, that an opportunity to be heard be "granted" before
chattels are taken from their possessor.28
In the seminal case of In re Vuitton et Fils S.A.,283 the Second
Circuit incorporated this Supreme Court precedent into its analysis
of the proper scope of due process in a commercial counterfeiting
case.284 This reliance may have been misplaced. Unlike the defendant
in a secured transaction case, 285 the defendant in a commercial
274. See supra notes 271-73 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text for a discussion of some of
the dangers of commercial counterfeiting.
276. As of December 31, 1985, the Supreme Court has not reviewed any actions
brought under the 1984 Act.
277. See infra notes 316-21 and accompanying text.
278. The seminal case in the area is a Second Circuit decision. In re Vuitton et
Fils S.A., 606 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam). This case has been extremely
influential. As one district court has noted, "many [counterfeit seizure] decisions
derive from the recognition in the seminal case of In re Vuitton et Fils S.A....
that [commercial counterfeiting warrants ex parte relief]." Fimab-Finanziaria Mag-
lifcio Biellese Fratelli Fila S.p.A. v. Kitchen, 548 F. Supp. 248, 250 (S.D. Fla.
1982).
279. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
280. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
281. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 341-42 (1969); Fuentes v.
Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 96 (1972).
282. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 96-97 (footnote omitted).
283. In re Vuitton et Fils S.A., 606 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
284. See id. at 3-5.
285. Fuentes involved a conditional contract sale. Therein appellants purchased
consumer durables on credit. Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 70-71. The statutes in issue
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counterfeiting case cannot trace his initial contact with the plaintiff
to a "meeting of the minds.12 6 Rather, the defendant's initial contact
with the plaintiff usually occurs when the plaintiff seeks to restrain
the defendant's tortious conduct.287 An examination of both the
Supreme Court cases and the Second Circuit's analysis in Vuitton288
confirms that a narrow scope of due process liberties is implicated
by seizures brought pursuant to the 1984 Act.
B. The Development of Procedural Due Process Standards:
Supreme Court Precedent
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of due process in com-
mercial litigation several times during the 1960's and 1970's.289 This
line of cases suggested that ex parte remedies are unavailable except
in the most extraordinary of circumstances in commercial litigation.29°
Justice Marshall once noted that the "stringent restrictions" 2 91 im-
posed on the availability of ex parte relief stem from the fact that
our entire jurisprudence runs counter to the notion of court action
before notice has been granted to both sides of a dispute.2 92 These
decisions had been interpreted by federal courts to all but preclude
the granting of ex parte relief. 93
authorized state agents to seize chattels by ex parte application. Id. at 69. The
statutes, therefore, facilitated the replevy of goods purchased on credit when the
purchaser defaulted upon the installment payments. Id. at 70-71.
286. A contract denotes a voluntary agreement between the parties to undertake
legally enforceable obligations. See J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 24 (2d
ed. 1977). It is said, therefore, that the parties have come to "a meeting of the
minds" when they enter into a contract. See id. The mutual assent which forms
the foundation of a contract is clearly not present in a commercial counterfeiting
case. See id. (discussion of mutual assent); see also Williston, Freedom of Contract,
6 CORNELL L. REv. 365 (1931) (same).
287. See supra note 286 and accompanying text.
288. In re Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 606 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
289. The focus of this Note's analysis is limited to those Supreme Court decisions
addressing procedural due process concerns in civil litigation. See, e.g., North
Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975); Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1969); Sniadach
v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
290. See Seizure Orders, supra note 16, at 460. The author noted that "luintil
a few years ago, based on the still relatively new procedural due process decisions
... it was thought in some circles that injunctive relief could not be granted ex
parte." Id.
291. See Granny Goose Foods v. Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 438-39 (1974).
292. See id.
293. See infra notes 313-15 and accompanying text.
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1. Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.
In Sniadach,'94 the petitioner contended that a Wisconsin statute
authorizing in rem seizure of a debtor's wages, without prior notice
and an opportunity to be heard, violated the Due Process Clause.2 95
The garnishment procedure in issue did not call for judicial partic-
ipation in the determination of whether the seizure order should
issue. 296 The Court noted that the statute was not narrowly-drawn
to meet the needs of "extraordinary situations. ' 297 Rather, the statute
authorized in rem seizure of property interests without notice when
in personam jurisdiction was readily available. 29 Given these facts
and the absence of a compelling state interest, 299 the Court held the
prejudgment garnishment proceeding violative of "the fundamental
principles of due process." 3°°
2. Fuentes v. Shevin
In Fuentes'0 the petitioners purchased goods on credit from re-
tailers. The contract between the parties contained a clause wherein
it was stated that a default on payments would entitle the creditor
to repossess the goods.30 2 Upon default, the retailers utilized state
remedies authorizing pre-judgment seizure of the chattels.0 3 The
statutes did not provide for notice.3 4
294. Sniadach v. Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
295. Id. at 338.
296. Id. at 338-39.
297. Id. at 339. When the public welfare is threatened, due process rights conform
to the exigency. See Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 598-
600 (1950) (fraudulent labeling of vitamin tablets); Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S.
245, 253-54 (1947) (bank insolvency); Coffin Bros. v. Bennet, 277 U.S. 29, 31
(1928) (bank insolvency); Owenby v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 110-12 (1921) (foreign
attachment proceedings).
298. Id. In personam jurisdicition was clearly available over the petitioner in
Sniadach. See id. at 338-39. The benefit of exercising personal jurisdiction over
the defendant before seizing his property lies in the fact that appearances by both
parties to a dispute will aid in the establishing the validity of the party's claim.
As Justice Stewart noted, "[s]ince [a creditor's] private gain is at stake, the danger
is all too great that his confidence in his cause will be misplaced." Fuentes, 407
U.S. at 83. Notice and an opportunity to be heard, therefore, minimize potentially
mistaken deprivations of property. See id.
299. Sniadach, 395 U.S. at 341-42.
300. Id. at 342.
301. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
302. Id. at 70.
303. Id. at 70-71.
304. Id. at 69-70.
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The Court found that the statutes were constitutionally defective
for several reasons. First, since no important state interest was
jeopardized, due process guaranteed to plaintiff an opportunity to
be heard prior to the seizure of the goods. 05 Second, the bond
posting requirement had a minimal deterrent effect and, therefore,
was not a sufficient safeguard to permit dispensing with notice
requirements.30 6 The Court reaffirmed the basic postulate that
"[plarties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard;
and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be
notified. '307
3. Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters
In Granny Goose,0 the Court addressed the durational aspect of
an ex parte temporary restraining order issued during a labor dis-
pute.3 ° The issue before the Court was whether the temporary
restraining order issued by a state court remained in full force after
removal of the case to federal district court.310 The Court, noting
that the concept of jurisprudence ran contrary to the granting of
ex parte relief, stated that the maximum duration of an ex parte
restraining order issued pursuant to Rule 65(b) was the ten-day
period authorized by statute and no more.3"'
Once again, jurisprudential concerns caused a majority of the
Court to limit the application of ex parte relief. Though not spe-
cifically addressing the same possessory due process concerns raised
by Fuentes, Granny Goose stands for the broader proposition that
the use of ex parte relief must be "stringently" limited by federal
courts. 2
As one commentator noted, these Supreme Court decisions ad-
dressing procedural due process had a profound effect on federal
judges. 3 Federal judges came to "frown ' 31 4 upon granting ex parte
relief. Due process required, it was believed, the giving of notice
and the granting of an opportunity to be heard to civil litigants
305. Id. at 90-94.
306. Id. at 83-84.
307. Id. at 80 (quoting Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. 223, 233 (1863)).
308. Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423 (1974).
309. Id. at 434-40.
310. See d.
311. Id. at 442-44.
312. Id. at 438-39.
313. Seizure Orders, supra note 16, at 460.
314. See id.
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prior to the State's authorization of seizure of chattels." 5 These
Supreme Court cases suggested that ex parte relief in commercial
counterfeiting cases was inconsistent with the due process standards
articulated by the Court in Sniadach, Fuentes and Granny Goose.
Decisions following the Sniadach line of cases narrowed the sweeping
language of the Fuentes decision.
These later decisions '1 6 suggest that it is not whether notice and
an opportunity to be heard prior to a taking of a property interest
that is dispositive of the due process issues implicated by statutes
that provide for ex parte relief. Rather, due process requirements
are satisfied provided that the ultimate determination of the propriety
of the taking rests with the judiciary.3' 7 Thus, if a judicial hearing
is provided after the taking, due process principles are not offended." 8
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co.,3t 9 is illustrative of this trend.
Mitchell involved an installment sale contract between the parties.3 2°
Alleging that the petitioner was delinquent on his payments, re-
spondent sought ex parte relief to secure possession of the goods
during the pendency of the action. Petitioner asserted that the Lou-
isiana statute violated the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment because the sequestration writ issued ex parte, without
prior notice or opportunity for a hearing.321 In the Supreme Court,
315. See Seizure Orders, supra note 16, at 460.
316. As one district court has noted, "the [Supreme] Court retreated from its
position in Fuentes in Mitchell." Del's Big Saver Foods, Inc. v. Carpenter Cook,
Inc., 603 F. Supp. 1071, 1074 (W.D. Wis. 1985). In Del's Big Saver, the district
court compared the holdings of Mitchell with North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-
Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975). In Di-Chem, the Court struck down a Georgia
statute which authorized a creditor to obtain a writ of garnishment issued by a
court clerk on an affidavit containing only conclusory allegations. Moreover, the
statute permitted the debtor to dissolve the garnishment only after posting a security
bond with the court. Del's Big Saver, 603 F. Supp. at 1074. The Supreme Court
struck down the statute in Di-Chem for two reasons: First, there was no prede-
privation protections as in Mitchell (attorney's fees and damage provisions). Second,
the debtor was not entitled to an immediate hearing after the seizure to dissolve
the writ. Id. at 1074 (citing Di-Chem, 419 U.S. at 607); see Parratt v. Taylor, 451
U.S. 527 (1981); Trans-Asiatic Oil Ltd. S.A. v. Apex Oil Co., 743 F.2d 956 (1st
Cir. 1984); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 737 F.2d 894 (lth Cir. 1984).
317. The Court noted that the requirements of due process of law "are not
technical, nor is any particular form of procedure necessary." Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1973) (quoting Inland Empire Council v. Millis, 325
U.S. 697, 710 (1945)). The Court added that "[ilt is sufficient, where only property
rights are concerned, that there is at some stage an opportunity for a hearing and
a judicial determination." Id. at 612 (quoting Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry,
339 U.S. 594, 599 (1950)).
318. Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 611-13.
319. 416 U.S. 600 (1973).
320. See id. at 601-02.
321. See id. at 603-10.
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petitioner contended that a long line of cases decided by the Court
required that a hearing be provided for before disturbing his pos-
sessory interest in the chattels.322 The Court rejected this argument
and noted that the pre-Sniadach line of cases "merely stand[s] for
the proposition that a hearing must be had before one is finally
deprived of his property and do not at all deal with the need for
a predetermination hearing where a full and immediate post-deter-
mination hearing is provided." 3 3 Thus, the Court concluded by
stating that the usual rule is that "[w]here only property rights are
involved, mere postponement of the judicial enquiry is not a denial
of due process, if the opportunity given for ultimate judicial de-
termination is adequate. 324
The Court distinguished Fuentes by noting that in that case the
Florida replevin statute merely required "bare assertions" by the
party that he was entitled to the writ.325 Moreover, the statute did
not require judicial supervision of the writ process.3 26 The statute
was therefore found to be constitutionally defective.3 27
In Mitchell, by contrast, the sequestration statute required "judicial
control of the process from beginning to end. 3 2 Moreover, the
sequestration statute provided for the award of damages32 9 and at-
torney's fees330 in the event of a wrongful issuance of the writ, thus
minimizing the possibility of an erroneous taking.
Thus, Mitchell stands for the proposition that due process re-
quirements are not offended by statutes authorizing ex parte relief
provided that the judiciary plays more than a perfunctory supervisory
role and that alternative remedies are available to insure that the
risk of an erroneous taking is minimized.
V1. The Proper Due Process Standard in Commercial
Counterfeiting Litigation
In the landmark decision of In re Vuitton et Fils S.A.,"' the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the trend of
322. See id. at 611.
323. Id.
324. Id. (quoting Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589, 596 (1931)).
325. Id. at 615 (citing Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 74 (1972)).
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 616.
329. Id. at 617.
330. Id.
331. In re Vuitton et Fils, S.A., 606 F.2d 1 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
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withholding ex parte relief in commercial counterfeiting litigation.
The court of appeals affirmed a district court decision which had
granted a motion seeking an ex parte seizure order in a commercial
counterfeiting case.332 Although the court of appeals reached the
proper result, the court could have based its decision on a broader
basis than the textual reading of Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 333
Ex parte relief can effectuate a vital state interest-the seizure of
dangerous counterfeit goods.134 Thus, ex parte relief is wholly con-
sistent with the long recognized principal that the appropriate scope
of due process should contract in the face of ."public urgency."
Because commercial counterfeiting generates grave health risks, 35 a
court should not rely on the expansive view of due process articulated
by the Supreme Court in Sniadach, Fuentes, and Granny Goose
Foods. Rather, a very narrow view of due process rights should be
inferred .336
VII. A Proposed Test
When determining whether an ex parte seizure order should issue
under the 1984 Act, a court should undertake the following analysis.
First, it must distinguish between goods which are produced do-
mestically and those which are manufactured abroad. If the goods
in question have a registered trademark and have their genesis in
foreign production, the goods are not the proper subject of an ex
parte order. 3 7 Whether the goods are of domestic or foreign origin,
if they are marketed through the use of a counterfeit reproduction
of a trademark, they are the proper subject of an ex parte order. 3 1
In borderline cases, a court should employ a two-tier analysis.
Procedural considerations339 require a clear showing of the reasons
why notice should not be required before an ex parte order may
issue. Various good faith indicia can refute this assertion.3 40 More-
over, a court should consider less dramatic remedies34' before au-
332. Id. at 1-2.
333. Id. at 3-4.
334. For a discussion of the dangers of counterfeit goods, see supra notes'21-
26 and accompanying text.
335. See supra notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
336. See infra Section VI1.
337. See supra notes 213-14 and accompanying text.
338. See supra notes 260-70 and accompanying text.
339. See supra notes 260-70 and accompanying text.
340. See supra note 262 and accompanying text.
341. See supra notes 264-65 and accompanying text.
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thorizing an ex parte order. On the second tier, constitutional
considerations must be considered. In cases of blatant counterfeiting,
the constitutionally protected interests of the suspect counterfeiter
are outweighed by the societal interest in curbing commercial coun-
terfeiting. The ex parte order should therefore issue. A court con-
fronted with a request for a seizure order should employ the due
process analysis undertaken by the Supreme Court in Mitchell. The
1984 Act's procedures are similiar to the sequestration statute in
issue in Mitchell: there are provisions for damages and attorney's
fees in the event of an erroneous issuance and the requirement of
affidavits to show cause. More importantly, the 1984 Act requires
judicial supervision of the issuance process from beginning to end.
While cases involving bona fide trademark disputes present heightened
constitutional considerations,34 2 the 1984 Act contains adequate pro-
cedural safeguards to minimize erroneous takings. The 1984 Act, there-
fore, passes constitutional muster. A court should examine the true
basis of due process.34 3 If the defendant has a legitimate property
interest to protect in the goods he possesses, a court should balance
the interests of the party in light of the gravity of the remedy.
VIII. Conclusion
Ex parte remedies are necessary to curb the growing and historically
pervasive problem of commercial counterfeiting. By evaluating the
legislative history of the 1984 Act, one will perceive that Congress
did not intend to impinge upon legitimate business practices. Nor does
the 1984 Act contain unconstitutional seizure procedures. Accordingly,
the limits on the 1984 Act's application represents a sensible legislative
response to the ills of commercial counterfeiting.
Brian J. Kearney
342. See supra notes 267-70 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 271-82 and accompanying text.
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